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Following Lower-Court Precedent
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl†
This Article examines the role of lower-court precedent in the US Supreme
Court’s decisions. The Supreme Court is rarely the first court to consider a legal
question, and therefore the Court has the opportunity to be informed by and perhaps even persuaded by the views of the various lower courts that have previously
addressed the issue. This Article considers whether the Court should give weight to
lower-court precedent as a matter of normative theory and whether the Court in
fact does so as a matter of practice. To answer the normative question, this Article
analyzes a variety of potential reasons to give weight to lower-court precedent, including reasons related to stability, constraint, and the wisdom of crowds. To address the descriptive question, this Article examines the current justices’ voting behavior and reasoning, over a period of several recent years, in cases in which the
Court resolved splits in the lower courts. The Article’s conclusions shed light on
broader debates over interpretive methodology and the Supreme Court’s role as the
manager of a large judicial system.
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INTRODUCTION
The US Supreme Court is almost never the first court to consider a question. By the time a question makes its way to the
Court, it will often have been debated and decided by numerous
lower courts over a period of years, sometimes decades.1 Nobody
would argue that the Supreme Court should be bound, as a formal
matter, by lower-court precedents. Still, if the lower courts have
1
See, for example, Hertz Corp v Friend, 559 US 77, 89–93 (2010) (describing fifty
years of controversy in the lower courts over the meaning of “principal place of business”
in 28 USC § 1332 and finally resolving the matter); Smith v City of Jackson, Mississippi,
544 US 228, 230, 236–38 (2005) (deciding whether a disparate-impact theory of recovery
is available under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, a question that
lower courts had debated for decades).
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overwhelmingly decided a question in a certain way, should the
Supreme Court give their views some genuine weight, even if
the Court’s own independent judgment leans in the other direction? Or should the Court act as if it were writing on a blank
slate, as if it were offering the first word as well as the last?
Should the answer depend on the circumstances, and if so,
which circumstances matter and why?
The Supreme Court has neither a solid theory nor a steady
practice when it comes to using lower-court precedent. In reading the Court’s opinions, one sometimes finds statements to the
effect that a particular decision accords with, or departs from,
the views of most of the lower courts.2 These statements, whether
found in the majority opinion or in separate concurrences or dissents, are sometimes offered in passing, as if casually observing
a coincidence. But in other instances the views of the lower
courts are presented as if they play a more important role in the
analysis, as if they hold some degree of authority. That is, some
opinions suggest that the Supreme Court decided the question
in a certain way (or should have decided it in a certain way) because most of the lower courts had done so. Many such opinions
will be described below, but one recent example is the majority
opinion in United States v Tinklenberg,3 which concerned the
federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974.4 The majority found that the
statute’s key language was facially ambiguous and then listed a
series of six contextual considerations that together identified
one interpretation as correct.5 The second of these considerations, listed before legislative history and workability, was that
all but one of the courts of appeals had ruled the same way, a
factor that the Court deemed “entitled to strong consideration,
particularly when those courts have maintained that interpretation consistently over a long [ ] period of time.”6
When an opinion suggests that it is relying on the lower
courts as authorities, other opinions in the same case sometimes
2
See, for example, Coleman v Court of Appeals of Maryland, 132 S Ct 1327, 1332
(2012) (“In agreement with every Court of Appeals to have addressed this question, this
Court now holds . . .”); Cullen v Pinholster, 131 S Ct 1388, 1417 (2011) (Sotomayor dissenting) (observing that the Court’s majority opinion “charts a [ ] novel course that, so
far as I am aware, no court of appeals has adopted”); Abbott v United States, 131 S Ct 18,
23 (2010) (“We hold, in accord with the courts below, and in line with the majority of the
Courts of Appeals . . .”).
3
131 S Ct 2007 (2011).
4
Pub L No 93-619, 88 Stat 2076, codified as amended at 18 USC § 3161 et seq.
5
See Tinklenberg, 131 S Ct at 2013–16.
6
Id at 2014.
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respond by explicitly rejecting that mode of analysis. That happened in Tinklenberg, for example,7 as well as in a case decided
a few weeks earlier, in which the dissent’s heavy reliance on
lower courts drew the response that the Court has “no warrant
to ignore clear statutory language on the ground that other
courts have done so.”8 In another recent case, the majority’s repeated invocations of uniform support from the federal courts of
appeals9 prompted the dissent to answer that “we do not resolve
questions such as the one before us by a show of hands.”10
Another common approach to lower-court precedent is virtually, or sometimes literally, to ignore it. In one recent case, the
dissent relied on decades of practice in many district courts and
had support from a large majority of the federal courts of appeals that had addressed the question,11 but the Court’s majority
opinion barely acknowledged that its decision went so clearly
against the grain of that lower-court precedent.12 In other cases,
a lengthy history of lower-court engagement with a question will
go totally unmentioned, as if it had never happened.13
The absence of a settled approach to dealing with the views
of the lower courts is odd considering that the issue is so pervasive. Then again, perhaps the lack of a developed theory and
consistent practice should come as no surprise, given that some
other aspects of the Court’s decisionmaking methodology—in
particular its approaches to constitutional and statutory
interpretation—seem not to enjoy ordinary stare decisis effect.14
7
See id at 2018 (Scalia concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The
clarity of the text is doubtless why, as the Court’s opinion points out, every Circuit disagrees with the [decision under review]. . . . Clarity of text produces unanimity of Circuits—not, as the Court’s opinion would have it, unanimity of Circuits clarifies text.”)
(citation omitted).
8
Milner v Department of the Navy, 131 S Ct 1259, 1268 (2011). See also id at 1269
(“We will not flout all usual rules of statutory interpretation to take the side of the bare
majority [of lower courts].”).
9
See CSX Transportation, Inc v McBride, 131 S Ct 2630, 2640–41 (2011).
10 Id at 2650 (Roberts dissenting). See also Global-Tech Appliances, Inc v SEB SA,
131 S Ct 2060, 2073 (2011) (Kennedy dissenting) (“[C]ounting courts in a circuit split is
not this Court’s usual method for deciding important questions of law.”).
11 See Taniguchi v Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd, 132 S Ct 1997, 2008–09, 2010–11
(2012) (Ginsburg dissenting).
12 See id at 2000–01 & n 1, 2005 n 5 (majority) (observing that the circuits were
split but citing only two conflicting decisions).
13 See Part III.A.2.
14 See Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 Georgetown L J 1863, 1872–84 (2008) (discussing whether the
Court grants stare decisis effect to statutory interpretation methodologies); Richard H.
Fallon Jr, Constitutional Constraints, 97 Cal L Rev 975, 1013 (2009) (“[T]he justices have

01 BRUHL_ART_SOFTA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

Following Lower-Court Precedent

9/5/14 11:21 AM

855

If the Court can be intentionalist on Monday, textualist on
Tuesday, and pragmatic on Wednesday, perhaps it is only natural that the Court would honor lower-court consensus one day,
openly reject it the next day, and neglect it altogether the rest of
the week. Moreover, the more one ponders what the Court
should do with lower-court precedent, the more complicated and
interesting the question becomes. The potential reasons to defer
to lower-court precedent are multiple and diverse, as are the
cases that the Supreme Court confronts and the jurisprudential
commitments that the justices bring to their work, so a simple
resolution may not be feasible.
With the aim of illuminating this intriguing problem, this
Article examines the Supreme Court’s treatment of lower-court
precedent in both its normative and descriptive dimensions.
Part I frames the inquiry, and then Part II addresses the central
normative issues: Should the Supreme Court ever defer to lower
courts on questions of law, and, if so, on what grounds? I present
and evaluate half a dozen potential reasons—from stability to
judicial constraint to the wisdom of crowds—for the Court to
give lower-court decisions some precedential weight. In most
cases, the argument for following the lower courts is not very
powerful, but in a subset of cases it is.
With the benefit of the theoretical framework developed in
Parts I and II, Part III then examines the Court’s actual practices
both qualitatively and quantitatively. I seek to identify every
instance in which the Supreme Court’s opinions relied on lowercourt precedent during three recent Supreme Court terms,
which cover the period from October 2010 through June 2013.
For the same period, I also examine how the justices voted when
there was a clearly prevailing view in the lower courts. These
three terms capture the first three years of the Court as currently
constituted—that is, since Justice Elena Kagan replaced Justice
John Paul Stevens. There are a number of interesting findings.
Notably, while it appears that the Court sides with the majority
of the lower courts the majority of the time, it is not at all
uncommon for the Court to reject positions that have enjoyed
the support of lopsided majorities of the lower courts. There are
also important differences among the current justices, with some
justices ignoring or outright shunning lower-court precedent
seldom exhibited much interest in attempting to bind either themselves or each other, in
advance, to the kind of general interpretive approaches [to constitutional adjudication]
that academic theorists champion.”).
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even as other justices appear to accord the lower courts a measure of deference. These differences can be explained through reference to the justices’ deeper jurisprudential commitments and
can shed light on the methodological divide between the Court’s
conservatives and liberals.
The Conclusion explores some broader practical and theoretical implications of the analysis. In particular, it addresses
the interaction between precedent and foundational theories like
textualism, and it considers whether a Supreme Court that is
only sporadically attentive to lower-court precedent can avoid
destabilizing a judicial system in which other courts use precedent quite differently.
I. FOCUSING THE INQUIRY WITH SOME INITIAL DISTINCTIONS
Precedent is ubiquitous in judicial decisionmaking. Once the
inquiry is narrowed to the use of lower-court precedent by the
Supreme Court, there still remain a variety of ways in which such
precedent might come into play. The following sections introduce
some distinctions among uses of lower-court precedent in order to
focus the inquiry further.
A.

Certiorari Stage and Merits Stage

At the outset, we should distinguish between the certiorari
stage, the Court’s largely discretionary process for choosing
which cases to hear, and the merits stage, at which the Court
actually answers the legal questions that it has chosen to consider. In recent years, the Court has given plenary consideration
to only about eighty cases per term.15 Probably the most significant factor in selecting those few cases is the presence or absence of a conflict in the lower courts on an important, recurring
question of federal law.16 This is not to say that a split is always

15 See Judicial Business of the United States Courts: 2013 Annual Report of the Director table A-1 (Administrative Office of the US Courts 2013), online at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/appendices/A01Sep13
.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014).
16 See US S Ct Rule 10(a)–(b) (listing conflicts in the lower courts as grounds for
granting certiorari). See also Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 Va L Rev 1567,
1630–36 (2008) (reviewing empirical analyses showing that lower-court conflict is still
the most important factor in granting certiorari); H.W. Perry Jr, Deciding to Decide:
Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court 246, 251 (Harvard 1991) (deeming
lower-court conflicts the most important factor in granting certiorari). A mere division of
authority is not sufficient; the importance of the question presented matters too, as does
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necessary, especially when the case involves matters of high public
importance, but the absence of conflict weighs heavily against a
grant of certiorari and will usually (though not always) prevent
the Court from intervening.17 Lower-court views, particularly
when they are unanimous, are thus honored routinely at the
certiorari stage in the sense that they are left alone.
This Article’s central concern, however, is the merits stage,
and it is here that acceding to the views of inferior courts raises
more interesting issues. Once the Court has decided to invest its
time and effort in answering some question, is there any reason
that it should care how the majority of the lower courts, or even
all of them, have previously answered that question? Once the
Court determines to reach the merits, one might suppose that it
should simply try to decide the case correctly, according to its
own view of the matter. It can thus be jarring to read a Supreme
Court opinion that seems to aim at a less ambitious goal, such
as a recent dissenting opinion that advocated following a longstanding lower-court interpretation that was described (twice)
merely as “reasonable,” rather than as the best or the correct interpretation.18 Mere reasonableness does not sound like the
standard that a reviewing court ordinarily demands of lowercourt determinations of law, which are reviewed de novo and
thus theoretically without any deference.19
Of course, “deciding correctly” is a complicated matter. Correctness might not exist in a vacuum; legal questions have histories. The purpose of Part II is to consider the various ways in
which the lower courts’ actions might help to reveal or determine the correct decision for the Supreme Court.
B.

Distinguishing among Various Uses of Lower-Court

whether the issue has had a chance to mature through a bit of percolation. See Perry,
Deciding to Decide at 230–34, 253–60 (cited in note 16).
17 See Perry, Deciding to Decide at 253–54, 277–79 (cited in note 16).
18 Milner v Department of the Navy, 131 S Ct 1259, 1275, 1278 (2011) (Breyer dissenting) (“[E]ven if the majority’s analysis would have persuaded me if written on a
blank slate, [the leading lower-court opinion’s] analysis was careful and its holding reasonable.”). See also McNally v United States, 483 US 350, 376 (1987) (Stevens dissenting)
(“In these cases I am convinced that those [lower-court] judges correctly understood the
intent of the Congress that enacted this statute. Even if I were not so persuaded, I could
not join a rejection of such a long-standing, consistent interpretation of a federal statute.”)
(emphasis added).
19 See 5 Am Jur 2d Appellate Review § 647 (2014). When the legal question is one
of state law rather than federal law, the Supreme Court has sometimes deferred to lower
federal courts. See Salve Regina College v Russell, 499 US 225, 241–42 (1991) (Rehnquist
dissenting) (citing examples).
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Precedent
This Article addresses the weight that the Supreme Court
should accord the lower courts’ views as persuasive interpretive
inputs when it addresses a question previously addressed by the
lower courts. For example, if six circuits have held that skateboards are “vehicles” within the meaning of a statute barring
vehicles from federal wildlife refuges, and only one circuit has
disagreed, how should that division affect the Supreme Court’s
resolution of that question? That manner of using precedent
should be distinguished from various other roles that lowercourt precedent plays in Supreme Court decisions.
We can begin by distinguishing and setting aside those
situations in which lower-court precedent is relevant because
the particular doctrines at issue themselves direct the Supreme
Court to consider the state of the preexisting law. Some examples will clarify. Consider the doctrine of qualified immunity,
which applies when government officials are sued for violating
constitutional rights. In such a case, it is not necessarily determinative that the official violated the law, for qualified immunity
shields the official from liability unless the illegality was clear at
the time of the alleged violation.20 The inquiry into the clarity of
the preexisting law often calls for an examination of not only
Supreme Court precedent, but also that of the lower courts, for
the latter may well have been the precedent that most directly
addressed the particular circumstances that confronted the official.21 A related example comes from the habeas context, in
which the Supreme Court might examine the prevailing law of
the lower courts to determine whether one of its recent decisions
constitutes a “new rule” that does not apply retroactively to upset
old criminal convictions.22 Similarly, the views of lower courts
are relevant in assessing whether a litigant’s arguments were so

20

See Pearson v Callahan, 555 US 223, 231–32, 243–44 (2009).
See, for example, Wilson v Layne, 526 US 603, 617 (1999) (noting the absence of
“a consensus of [lower-court] cases of persuasive authority such that a reasonable officer
could not have believed that his actions were lawful”). Likewise, the state of precedent,
including lower-court precedent, can be directly relevant to determining whether a good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. See, for example, Davis v United States,
131 S Ct 2419, 2428–29 (2011) (holding that exclusion was improper when the search
complied with then-binding circuit law).
22 Chaidez v United States, 133 S Ct 1103, 1111 (2013) (determining that a Supreme
Court decision was a “new rule” in part because the decision overturned the law of the
vast majority of jurisdictions). But see id at 1120 (Sotomayor dissenting) (disputing the
relevance of the lower-court cases).
21
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frivolous that the imposition of attorneys’ fees or sanctions is
warranted.23
Still another use of lower-court decisions, also not at issue
here, occurs when lower-court case law on unrelated questions,
or even from separate fields of law, is cited as evidence of a
term’s ordinary meaning. That is, if the Supreme Court wants to
know whether the phrase “filed any complaint” in the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 193824 can include complaints made orally, the
Court might consider, among other things, whether judicial
opinions from various fields of law ever refer to oral submissions
as “filings.”25 In such cases, lower courts are being treated like
dictionaries in the same way that the Court sometimes uses
newspapers and other writings in order to discern the ordinary
meaning of a word or phrase.26 Lower-court decisions used in
this way are being given a sort of linguistic authority, but the
lower-court decisions themselves do not address the question
before the Court and so are not really being invoked as authorities on that question. Similarly irrelevant here are instances in
which the Supreme Court looks to lower-court decisions predating some enactment in an effort to understand the legal background against which Congress legislated.27 In such an instance,
the lower courts’ decisions are derivatively useful to the extent
that they can shed light on likely congressional intent or reveal
the existing fabric of the law into which the new statute has to
be woven, but they do not and could not directly address the
question before the Court.
Finally, the usage of lower-court precedent at issue in this
Article is distinct from the phenomenon of the Supreme Court
23 See, for example, Pierce v Underwood, 487 US 552, 555–56, 569 (1988) (discussing
lower-court decisions in determining whether the government’s litigation position was
“substantially justified” for purposes of a fee-shifting statute).
24 29 USC § 201 et seq.
25 Kasten v Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp, 131 S Ct 1325, 1329, 1332
(2011). See also Moskal v United States, 498 US 103, 121–25 (1990) (Scalia dissenting)
(relying on lower-court decisions, among other things, to establish the legal meaning of
the term “falsely made”).
26 See, for example, Muscarello v United States, 524 US 125, 126–30 (1998) (citing,
among other things, dictionaries, the Bible, Robinson Crusoe, Moby-Dick, and computer
databases of newspaper articles to determine the meaning of the word “carry”).
27 See, for example, Kappos v Hyatt, 132 S Ct 1690, 1697–1700 (2012); Setser v
United States, 132 S Ct 1463, 1468 (2012); Skilling v United States, 130 S Ct 2896, 2930–
31 (2010). The Court’s opinions interpreting 42 USC § 1983 frequently canvass the state
of the common law when the statute was enacted, which involves considering scads of
nineteenth-century state-court decisions. See, for example, Filarsky v Delia, 132 S Ct
1657, 1662–65 (2012).
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borrowing language from the lower courts for use in its own
opinions. Research shows that the Court sometimes copies
material (with or without attribution) from lower-court decisions, especially the particular decision under review.28 Even
when that kind of borrowing occurs in the Court’s legal analysis
(as opposed to its recitation of the facts of the case before it), the
borrowing can happen whether or not the borrowed-from decision represents the majority of the lower courts (and, moreover,
the Court can copy language in order to criticize the copied-from
decision).29 Therefore, that kind of borrowing does not really
bear on the questions explored here, which involve whether the
Court does and should adopt particular legal positions because
most of the lower courts have done so.
To be clear, the point of setting aside these uses of lowercourt decisions is not to declare them unimportant. The lower
courts generate much of the law of our land, and their work
therefore finds its way into the Supreme Court’s opinions for
countless reasons. The topic explored here is the Supreme
Court’s use of lower-court precedent as a persuasive authority
when the Court addresses a question that lower courts have
previously decided. Now that the inquiry has been focused, this
Article considers the variety of reasons why lower-court decisions on a question of law might carry weight with the Supreme
Court.
II. ASSESSING POTENTIAL REASONS TO DEFER TO LOWER COURTS
The Supreme Court has not articulated a theoretical account
of whether the lower courts’ views matter, when they matter, or
why they matter. Some scholars have addressed certain aspects of
these issues, typically focusing on some particular rationale for
deference to lower courts. Probably the most notable treatment is
Professors William Eskridge and Philip Frickey’s study of the
Supreme Court’s 1993 Term.30 Emphasizing the value of stability
in the law, the authors criticize the Court for too casually upsetting settled law, including law represented by long-standing
lines of lower-court precedent.31 Stability is indeed an important
28 See Pamela C. Corley, Paul M. Collins Jr, and Bryan Calvin, Lower Court Influence
on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content, 73 J Polit 31, 37–38, 42 (2011).
29 See id at 33–34, 42.
30 See generally William N. Eskridge Jr and Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as
Equilibrium, 108 Harv L Rev 26 (1994).
31 See id at 76–81.
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value, but stability is just one of several potential reasons for
giving weight to the views of the lower courts. In fact, there are
at least six distinct justifications. Some of them have more intuitive appeal than others, and some of them find more support in
the Court’s opinions than others. Some of the rationales may require near unanimity in the lower courts, though others may
have some force even in the case of narrower majorities.
The six rationales can be loosely grouped into two broad
categories: those that view lower-court decisions as possessing
some informational content and those that seek to promote some
other institutional value. The first group contains the following
three rationales:
• Epistemic value. The Supreme Court should pay attention to the lower courts because the fact that they have
ruled a certain way tends to show that their favored
position is actually correct. That is, the views of the
lower courts can have epistemic, or truth-revealing,
value.
• Modest pragmatism. When the lower courts generate a
certain state of the law, the Supreme Court can then
observe the consequences. If those consequences appear
tolerable, then a risk-averse high court might be reluctant to try out an untested rule with unknown effects.
• Acquiescence. If the lower courts have clearly settled
on a particular view of the law and Congress has not
repudiated that view, Congress can be said to have
implicitly ratified that view.
Honoring lower-court precedent can also advance at least
the following three institutional values:
• Stability. There is value in the law being settled and
stable. That is true whether the law comes from positive enactments, Supreme Court decisions, or a consistent line of lower-court authority.
• Compliance. The Supreme Court might have an easier
time getting the lower courts to obey its decisions if it
rules in accord with what most lower courts are already doing.
• Constraint. Following the lower courts and ratifying
their majority view provides an objectively constraining methodology for the Supreme Court to follow while
still ensuring that there is nationally uniform and
authoritative law.
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The following sections explore each rationale and consider
whether, when, and why it has force. After that, Part II.G combines the various partial insights to reach some more general
conclusions.
A.

Epistemic Value

Chief Justice John Roberts recently wrote, in a dissenting
opinion that rejected the majority’s appeal to the authority of
lower-court consensus, that the Supreme Court “do[es] not resolve questions . . . by a show of hands.”32 In one sense he is
wrong, for the Court itself operates by majority rule when the
justices disagree: five trumps four.33 But in another sense he is
correct. A court is supposed to be a “forum of principle,”34 a
domain in which majoritarian might does not make right.
Nonetheless, one can construct a fairly simple argument to
the effect that the Supreme Court, when engaged in its own
search for the correct answer to the question before it, should
give weight to the views of other decisionmakers. Individual
wisdom is limited, so heeding the judgment of other actors—at
least if they are reasonably smart, well-informed, and quite numerous—might guide the Court toward the correct answer. This
borrowed wisdom could come from any number of sources, including foreign courts, expert administrative agencies, legal historians, or popular opinion. Which of those sources are worth
heeding depends, of course, on the nature of the question and
one’s theory of judicial decisionmaking. But one especially promising source of guidance is the lower courts, for they, unlike
some other sources, broadly resemble the Supreme Court in
terms of the questions that they confront and the norms that
govern their decisionmaking. The fact that a large majority of
judges have converged on a particular answer to some legal
question provides some reason to believe that their answer is
indeed correct.35
32

CSX Transportation, Inc v McBride, 131 S Ct 2630, 2650 (2011) (Roberts dissenting).
For a valuable meditation on the role of majority rule in multimember courts, see
generally Jeremy Waldron, Five to Four: Why Do Bare Majorities Rule on Courts?, 123
Yale L J 1692 (2014).
34 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 69–71 (Harvard 1985).
35 My discussion of the epistemic argument for following lower-court precedent
largely adheres to that argument’s internal logic. The epistemic argument confronts
some significant difficulties even on its own terms. Those skeptical of the possibility of
legal claims being correct will of course have their own more fundamental doubts. This is
not the place to review the debate over whether legal propositions can be true, but for
33
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More formally, one can support this commonsense intuition
by invoking the Condorcet Jury Theorem.36 When the members
of a group are all better than random at selecting the correct answer to a question, the likelihood that a majority vote of the
group will select the correct answer approaches certainty as the
size of the group increases.37 Thus, the aggregate decisionmaking ability of a modestly competent large group can outperform
the judgment of the most expert individuals. The Jury Theorem
or similar logic has been used as support for the judicial doctrine
of stare decisis and, more generally, as support for recognizing
the wisdom of tradition.38 The same logic could be invoked in the
case of lower-court precedent. If one assumes that lower-court
judges are better than random in their decisions, then the result
embraced by the majority of a large group of them is probably
right, and it would be wise for the Supreme Court to give weight
to that majority view, even if the justices are individually more
competent than their “inferiors.” To give a stylized example, if
lower-court judges are each right 60 percent of the time, and if
10 out of 15 of them answer some question a particular way, we
can be almost 90 percent sure that the majority is right.39
helpful points of entry into that debate, see Dennis Patterson, Law and Truth 3–21 (Oxford 1996). See also generally Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy, in Dennis Patterson,
ed, A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 488 (Blackwell 1999).
36 See Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, marquis de Condorcet, Condorcet: Selected
Writings 48–49 (Bobbs-Merrill 1976) (Keith Michael Baker, ed). See also Duncan Black,
The Theory of Committees and Elections 163 (Kluwer 1987).
37 The simplest version of the Jury Theorem involves a choice between two options
and requires that the members of the group be more than 50 percent likely to choose the
correct option. The Theorem can be generalized to plurality voting among more than two
options, though the results are not as powerful. See David M. Estlund, Democratic
Authority: A Philosophical Framework 226–30 (Princeton 2008); Christian List and Robert E. Goodin, Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 9 J Polit
Phil 277, 283–88 (2001). There is no need to dwell on these sorts of complications, for the
Jury Theorem suffers from more important limitations even in the simplest case (as this
Section will explain).
38 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Minds: Why the
Founding Document Doesn’t Mean What It Meant Before 51–52 (Princeton 2009) (linking
Condorcet to a Burkean form of judicial minimalism). See also John O. McGinnis and
Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 Nw U L Rev 803, 845
(2009) (“That a majority of Justices previously interpreted the original meaning of the
Constitution in one way provides evidence for that interpretation.”). For a criticism of
epistemic/Condorcetian defenses of precedent, see Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason, 107 Colum L Rev 1482, 1485–1517 (2007).
39 For the formula that gives this result, see Black, The Theory of Committees and
Elections at 164 (cited in note 36). It is not entirely clear how one should measure the
size of the “jury” that resolves an appeal. In the text above I count each judge separately,
but that is by no means the only approach. See note 43 (noting the possibility that judges
on a panel defer to each other).
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Nonetheless, there are several difficulties with the Condorcetinspired argument for deference to lower courts. One obvious
limitation is that the argument becomes more forceful as the
size of the majority increases—and so, even on its own terms,
the argument is weak in narrow splits. That by itself significantly
limits the domain in which the argument could operate. In order
to present the Condorcetian argument in its best light, let us
confine ourselves to the subset of Supreme Court cases that feature a more lopsided split. Even in those circumstances, the argument must confront at least the following three difficulties.
1. Independent decisions.
For one thing, the Jury Theorem derives its power from
aggregating the views of many independent individuals.40 As a
matter of established practice, however, lower courts are supposed to give weight to the views of other lower courts. Uniformity is, for the lower courts, a goal in its own right.41 The mere
fact that one circuit has answered a question in a particular way
provides a reason for other circuits to follow suit, a reason that
becomes stronger as more courts join the trend.42 Thus, a lopsided majority in the lower courts might not represent a consensus of experts but could simply demonstrate a powerful bandwagon effect.43 (In fact, one good argument against a firm rule of

40 It is not the case that the Jury Theorem is wholly inapplicable when the
decisionmakers are not independent (in the relevant, technical sense), but the lack of
independence reduces the effective size of the jury, diminishing the force of any consensus.
See Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld, Rousseau’s General Will: A Condorcetian Perspective, 82 Am Polit Sci Rev 567, 571 (1988). See also generally David M. Estlund, Opinion
Leaders, Independence, and Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, 36 Theory & Decision 131 (1994)
(discussing the meaning of “independence” in the Jury Theorem).
41 See Colby v J.C. Penney Co, 811 F2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir 1987):

Bearing in mind the interest in maintaining a reasonable uniformity of federal
law and in sparing the Supreme Court the burden of taking cases merely to resolve conflicts between circuits, we give most respectful consideration to the
decisions of the other courts of appeals and follow them whenever we can.
42 See David E. Klein, Making Law in the United States Courts of Appeals 88–91
(Cambridge 2004) (noting the varied reasons that appellate judges report for whether
and why they consider the judgments of sister circuits).
43 See generally Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to
Judgment: Persuasive Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts, 1 Am L & Econ Rev
158 (1999). Making matters worse, individual judges on an appellate panel might defer
to one another, such that the unanimous decision of a federal court of appeals does not
actually represent three separate votes. See generally Lee Epstein, William M. Landes,
and Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, 3 J Legal Analysis 101 (2011) (modeling the phenomenon of dissent aversion).
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intercircuit stare decisis is precisely that it gives too much
weight to the first-mover court, which could err and then drag
the others along.44) To the extent that the lower courts defer to
one another, that diminishes the argument that the Supreme
Court should in turn defer to their accumulated wisdom, which
is in fact not so accumulated after all.
2. Relative competence.
The Jury Theorem reminds us of the power of sheer numbers:
a large crowd of people of middling ability can outperform an
expert few. Nonetheless, the competence of individual decisionmakers still matters. If Supreme Court justices are significantly
more likely to reach correct results than lower-court judges, then a
bare majority on the Supreme Court could more reliably reach
the right result than could a sizable majority of lower-court
judges.
There are several reasons to believe that the Supreme Court
is, in the main, better positioned to reach correct decisions.45 To
be sure, different theories of judging may disagree about which
features of an environment best promote sound decisionmaking.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court operates in a resource-rich environment that most theories would deem helpful. Internally,
the justices have large and highly competent staffs of law clerks
and librarians.46 Perhaps more importantly, the Court’s relatively
small docket provides the luxury of time.47 Turning to external
resources, Supreme Court advocacy is increasingly the preserve

44 See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform 380–81 (Harvard 1999).
45 The next few paragraphs draw on material in two prior articles. See AaronAndrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable Deference to Agency Interpretations, 89 Notre
Dame L Rev 727, 740–41 (2013); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity:
How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 Cornell L Rev 433, 470–73 (2012).
46 See Posner, The Federal Courts at 140–42 (cited in note 44); Bruhl, 89 Notre
Dame L Rev at 740 (cited in note 45).
47 Occasionally, the Court or individual justices have to act on an emergency matter
with little time for reflection. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court’s ruminative
advantage is reduced. See Mike Dorf, How to Think about Likelihood of Success on the
Merits: Further Reflections on the Little Sisters and the Utah SSM Cases, Dorf on Law
(Jan 6, 2014), online at http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2014/01/how-to-think-about-likelihood
-of.html (visited Aug 12, 2014) (suggesting that it might be reasonable for a justice to use
lower-court views as a proxy for likelihood of success on the merits when under time
pressure, but that no such deference is appropriate when there is time for deliberation).
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of highly competent specialists.48 These lawyers, whether in
private firms, public-interest organizations, or the Solicitor
General’s office, bring a high degree of effort and skill to each
case and leave few stones unturned. To the extent that any important aspects of the case are neglected by the parties, amicus
briefs fill the gap. Almost every Supreme Court case attracts
them, often many of them.49 Aside from conventional legal arguments, these briefs can offer useful information on policy context, interest group alignments, preferences of other political actors, and relevant facts not contained in the formal record.50
Even when the United States or one of its agencies is not a party
to the case, the government usually files high-quality amicus curiae briefs that provide a wealth of useful information.51
The above list of contextual features omits the characteristics of the justices themselves.52 Supreme Court justices come
from a national talent pool, hold the most elite credentials, and
are closely scrutinized for the acceptability of their political
views. All of this differs somewhat for judges on lower federal
courts and on state courts (though, for the latter, the selection
processes differ substantially from state to state, making it hard to

48 See Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters before and within the Supreme Court:
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 Georgetown L J 1487, 1497–1502
(2008).
49 See Paul M. Collins Jr, Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and Judicial
Decision Making 47 (Oxford 2008); Joseph D. Kearney and Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U Pa L Rev 743, 751–56 (2000).
50 See Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, Mapping Out the Strategic Terrain: The Informational Role of Amici Curiae, in Cornell W. Clayton and Howard Gillman, eds, Supreme
Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches 215, 225–28 (Chicago 1999)
(explaining that amicus briefs often provide information about the preferences of the
other governmental branches and the public); Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of
Science and Law, 280 Science 537, 538 (1998) (stating that amicus briefs can educate the
Court on technical matters and improve decisionmaking); Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 Duke L J 1, 35–37 (2011)
(discussing the use of amicus briefs, especially in the Supreme Court, as sources of extrarecord facts). For a recent, skeptical take on the value of the factual information provided by some amicus briefs, see generally Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus
Facts, 100 Va L Rev (forthcoming 2014), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2409071 (visited Aug 12, 2014).
51 In recent years, the solicitor general has filed amicus briefs in about 75 percent of
the Supreme Court’s nonconstitutional civil cases in which the government was not already
a party. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray and Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s
Changing Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 BC L Rev 1323, 1359 & n 79 (2010).
52 Another factor not included in the list of the Court’s institutional advantages is
the possibility that the larger number of justices (always an en banc court of nine) provides for better deliberation. The modern Court seems not to engage in much collegial
debate. See William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court 254–55 (Knopf 2001).

01 BRUHL_ART_SOFTA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

Following Lower-Court Precedent

9/5/14 11:21 AM

867

generalize). Whether these personal characteristics make Supreme
Court justices more competent decisionmakers is contestable. It
probably makes them better in some ways (for example, understanding the preferences of national political elites and possessing academic knowledge of constitutional law) and worse in others (for example, empathizing with the experiences of ordinary
people). Regardless, any differences in the personal ability of
judges on different courts are probably swamped by much more
significant disparities in institutional context.
The decisionmaking environment is, on the whole, less favorable the lower one goes down the judicial pyramid. As one
moves down, the caseloads generally grow while the resources
shrink. The federal courts of appeals adjudicated over thirty-five
thousand cases on the merits in 2013.53 Although it would be too
simplistic to contrast that huge figure with the eighty or so cases
that the Supreme Court decided on the merits in each of the last
several years—for one thing, the justices (or their clerks) have to
wade through thousands of petitions for certiorari to find those
eighty cases54—the staggering contrast is nonetheless broadly
instructive. Further, the quality of the advocacy is generally
lower and more uneven in the lower courts.55 Amicus briefs,
which are ubiquitous in the Supreme Court, are less common in
federal courts of appeals and state high courts, thus depriving
those courts of potentially useful information and perspectives.56
Lower-court decisions are more likely to be eccentric or politically

53 2013 Judicial Business of the United States Courts: 2013 Annual Report of the
Director table S-3 (Administrative Office of the US Courts 2013), online at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/tables/S03Sep13.pdf
(visited Aug 12, 2014).
54 See 2013 Annual Report at table A-1 (cited in note 15).
55 See Posner, The Federal Courts at 142 (cited in note 44) (noting that the Supreme Court has the advantage of “better briefs and better-prepared oral arguments”);
Justice Stephen G. Breyer, 13 Scribes J Legal Writing 145, 160 (2010) (assessing briefing
in the Supreme Court as being “pretty uniformly good” and stating that “[y]ou’ll get very
good briefs in the circuits on a lesser number of occasions”).
56 See Wendy L. Martinek, Amici Curiae in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 34 Am Polit
Res 803, 806–09 (2006) (discussing amicus activity in courts of appeals versus the Supreme Court); Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal
Court: A Fine Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 Rev Litig 669, 686–
87 (2008) (discussing amicus activity in lower federal courts). See also generally Scott A.
Comparato, Amici Curiae and Strategic Behavior in State Supreme Courts (Praeger
2003) (discussing amicus participation and its effects in state courts).
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extreme, given that the decisionmaking units consist of smaller
numbers of judges.57
It should be said, in defense of the lower courts, that they do
have certain advantages over the Supreme Court. For one thing,
lower-court judges have more experience with some issues than
the appellate generalists on the Supreme Court. One would expect that federal bankruptcy judges are more knowledgeable
about bankruptcy law and policy, for example, and that the average federal or state trial judge probably understands the consequences of various procedural and evidentiary rules better than
the justices, most of whom have little or no trial experience.58
The justices’ opinions occasionally contain hints of deference
to lower-court expertise. In a securities case a few years ago, the
Court applied a test that departed from a long line of lowercourt interpretations.59 Justice Stevens wrote separately to explain that he would have followed that line of cases, a line that
had begun decades ago in the Second Circuit with opinions by
Judge Henry Friendly.60 Stevens cited not just the age and number of lower-court precedents, but also relied on Friendly’s reputation as “[o]ne of our greatest jurists.”61 Stevens seemed to suggest that the Second Circuit, and Friendly in particular, knew
more about how to shape securities law than the formally
“supreme” justices.62 (As this example shows, the reputations of
particular judges and courts matter, not just how many lower
courts are involved.) One also finds occasional references to the
expertise of trial judges as a class on matters of litigation proce-

57 See Michael Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 Colum L Rev 1600, 1608,
1630–33 (2000) (explaining that smaller groups of judges are likely to be less representative of the whole judiciary than larger groups).
58 See Kevin M. Clermont and Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing
Systems, 95 Iowa L Rev 821, 850–52 (2010) (noting the justices’ apparent confusion on
basic matters of trial procedure); Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The ForwardLooking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 Tex L Rev 1, 58 (1994) (noting
that “district courts might be better situated to determine whether particular evidentiary exclusionary rules deter police misconduct, given their greater exposure to testimony
by and about police officers”). On the current Court, only Justice Sonia Sotomayor has
experience as a trial judge. White House Office of the Press Secretary, Press Release,
Judge Sonia Sotomayor (May 26, 2009), online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press
_office/Background-on-Judge-Sonia-Sotomayor (visited Aug 12, 2009).
59 See Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, 130 S Ct 2869, 2878–81 (2010)
(Scalia).
60 Id at 2889 (Stevens concurring in the judgment).
61 Id at 2889–90 (Stevens concurring in the judgment).
62 See id at 2889 (Stevens concurring in the judgment) (calling the majority opinion
“misplaced” in light of the history of Second Circuit jurisprudence on the topic).
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dure.63 Invocations of the lower courts’ wisdom sometimes occur
in dissents rather than majority opinions, but Eric Hansford
found tentative support for the proposition that circuits with
greater experience in certain subject areas are affirmed more often
in those areas than non-expert circuits, though he deemed the
effect more likely attributable to the experienced circuits being
able to make better decisions than to the Supreme Court granting
those circuits any particular deference.64
For justices who regard legislative intent as an important
source of guidance, the lower courts might also hold an advantage, at least in theory, because the lower courts sometimes decide their cases at around the time of the original enactment,
with the Supreme Court following later. In another securities
case, the Supreme Court also overturned a long line of lowercourt precedent, but Justice Stevens would have followed those
cases because, among other things, the lower-court judges were
“closer to the times and climate of the [enacting] Congress.”65 Of
course, any advantage derived from being an early decisionmaker
has to be balanced against the inherent advantages of coming
later. As a particular question is litigated and decided repeatedly,
later courts can study the reasoning of those that came before,
dig more deeply into the relevant material, and perhaps discern
the consequences of the prior decisions.
The last few paragraphs have suggested that lower courts,
even individually, might possess certain advantages over the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court should hesitate, for example,
before upsetting a lower-court consensus on a matter of trial proce63 See, for example, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v United States, 491 US 617, 635
(1989) (Blackmun dissenting) (stating that the Court “should heed the warnings of our
District Court judges, whose day-to-day exposure to the criminal-trial process enables
them to understand, perhaps far better than we, the devastating consequences of [the
Court’s approach]”). Another area in which lower-court judges likely enjoy an advantage
over the Supreme Court is familiarity with state law. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Resuscitating Deference to Lower Federal Court Judges’ Interpretations of State Law, 77 S Cal L
Rev 975, 1022–26 (2004). However, questions of state law would rarely be the topic of a
split of authority warranting the Supreme Court’s intervention.
64 See Eric Hansford, Note, Measuring the Effects of Specialization with Circuit
Split Resolutions, 63 Stan L Rev 1145, 1146, 1155–56, 1167 (2011).
65 Central Bank of Denver, NA v First Interstate Bank of Denver, NA, 511 US 164,
192–93 (1994) (Stevens dissenting). Similarly, constitutional originalists might give extra weight to the views and practices of early government officials, many of whom were
involved in the framing and ratification of the Constitution. See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 Harv L Rev 26, 81 (2000) (suggesting that a
judge might think that “[i]f John Marshall and his brethren thought X, perhaps X is
right after all, despite initial appearances to the contrary”).
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dure about which the Court’s knowledge is remote and academic.
Nonetheless, in the run of cases, the Supreme Court operates in
circumstances that make it more capable than the lower courts
taken individually. The point of the Jury Theorem, of course, is
to consider the lower courts as a numerous group, but if the
Court’s competence advantage is large, it would take quite a
sizable lower-court majority for their collective view to carry
serious epistemic weight.
3. Different questions.
A less obvious but perhaps more fundamental problem with
the Condorcet-inspired argument for deferring to lower-court
views is that, in some cases, the Supreme Court is not even answering the same question that the lower courts addressed. This
is so for a few reasons. For one, the question in any case is not
just the proper interpretation of some statute or constitutional
provision on a blank slate, but rather the proper interpretation
given the constraints of precedent. Those constraints differ
markedly as one moves up the judicial hierarchy. The Supreme
Court’s holdings are absolutely binding on the lower courts but
only somewhat binding on the Court itself.66 A lower court might
face a question that finds an easy answer in existing Supreme
Court precedent, but in the Supreme Court the question could be
whether that precedent should be overruled, a question that the
lower courts could not entertain. Consider in that regard the
Court’s recent decision in Alleyne v United States,67 which evaluated whether the Sixth Amendment permits judges, rather than
juries, to find facts that increase a defendant’s minimum sentence.68 A prior Supreme Court case, Harris v United States,69
had permitted the practice.70 The lower court in Alleyne, like other
lower courts in countless decisions before it, had relied on Harris
and curtly rejected the defendant’s constitutional challenge.71 Yet

66 See Rodriguez de Quijas v Shearson/American Express, Inc, 490 US 477, 484
(1989) (explaining that “the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to [the Supreme] Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions”).
67 133 S Ct 2151 (2013).
68 Id at 2155.
69 536 US 545 (2002).
70 Id at 568.
71 See United States v Alleyne, 457 Fed Appx 348, 350 (4th Cir 2011) (stating that
“Supreme Court precedent forecloses” the defendant’s argument). See also, for example,
United States v Brown, 653 F3d 656, 659–60 (8th Cir 2011) (refusing to depart from the
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the Supreme Court overruled Harris in Alleyne.72 The lower
court was reversed even though it had decided “correctly.” The
Supreme Court was just asking a different question.
A related problem concerns Supreme Court dicta. Lower
courts are strongly influenced by the Supreme Court’s dicta,73
but the Supreme Court itself treats dicta more casually. For a
revealing example, consider whether the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 196774 (ADEA) recognizes a disparate-impact
theory of liability. Lower courts that addressed the question in
the statute’s early years overwhelmingly held that it did recognize such a theory.75 Then, in 1993, the Supreme Court’s Hazen
Paper Co v Biggins76 opinion stated that “[d]isparate treatment”—not disparate impact—“captures the essence of what
Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA.”77 This statement
would be considered dicta under any of the traditional definitions; indeed, the statement openly announced itself as such.78
And yet, after Hazen Paper, most circuits that addressed the
question as a matter of first impression held that the ADEA did
not recognize a disparate-impact theory—and some courts that
had previously accepted the theory reversed course.79 The Supreme
Court finally answered the question in 2005 and held, contrary
to the newly emerging countertrend triggered by its own dicta,
rule in Harris since “only the Supreme Court may overrule its controlling decisions”),
cert denied, 132 S Ct 1649 (2012).
72 Alleyne, 133 S Ct at 2163.
73 See, for example, Town Sound and Custom Tops, Inc v Chrysler Motors Corp, 959
F2d 468, 495 n 41 (3d Cir 1992) (“Generally, [ ] we consider and respect Supreme Court
dicta as well as holdings because the Supreme Court hears relatively few cases and frequently uses dicta to give guidance to the lower courts.”). See also David Klein and Neal
Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory versus Practice in Lower Court Decision Making, 54 Wm
& Mary L Rev 2021, 2025–26, 2032–42 (2013) (providing empirical evidence that the
holding/dictum distinction rarely affects lower-court decisionmaking); Frederick Schauer,
Opinions as Rules, 53 U Chi L Rev 682, 683–84 (1986) (“In interpretive arenas below the
Supreme Court, one good quote [from the Supreme Court] is worth a hundred clever
analyses of the holding.”).
74 29 USC § 621 et seq.
75 See Smith v City of Jackson, Mississippi, 544 US 228, 236–37 (2005) (collecting
cases illustrating the history of the statute’s interpretation in lower courts).
76 507 US 604 (1993).
77 Id at 610 (emphasis added).
78 See id (“[W]e have never decided whether a disparate impact theory of liability is
available under the ADEA, and we need not do so here.”) (citation omitted).
79 See Smith, 544 US at 236–37. See also Smith v City of Jackson, Mississippi, 351
F3d 183, 195 n 14 (5th Cir 2003) (citing Hazen Paper for support while recognizing that
it was not binding), affd 544 US 228 (2005); Mullin v Raytheon Co, 164 F3d 696, 700–01
(1st Cir 1999) (noting that “[t]he tectonic plates shifted” after Hazen Paper and that
courts started to reject the disparate-impact theory).
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that there was indeed a disparate-impact theory after all!80 The
seemingly portentous remark in Hazen Paper was dismissed as
irrelevant commentary.81 There are plenty of similar examples
in which lower courts followed dicta and then had the rug pulled
out from under them later.82 More broadly, if lower courts are
using dicta to try to predict what the Supreme Court will do
rather than trying to independently engage with the authoritative legal materials,83 then a consensus of the lower courts is not
very edifying to the Supreme Court.
Questions may also look different at different points in the
judicial hierarchy because the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari can—in a sort of legal version of Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle—itself shift the legal background so that the right answer to the question actually changes after the Supreme Court
decides to hear the case. For instance, a grant of certiorari occasionally induces the federal government to announce a new administrative interpretation of a statute. Such interpretations,
even when presented in formats such as an amicus brief by the
solicitor general, receive a degree of weight.84 The question for
the Supreme Court then becomes how best to interpret the statute
given the semiauthoritative gloss supplied by the executive
80 See Smith, 544 US at 240. The theory that the Court adopted was a rather narrow one as compared to the version of disparate impact that is available under Title VII.
See id.
81 See id at 237–38.
82 See generally, for example, Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc v West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources, 532 US 598 (2001). Justice Antonin Scalia
referred to the dissent’s call to honor the lower-court consensus on the question presented
as “particularly peculiar in the present case, since that [lower-court] majority has been nurtured and preserved by our own misleading dicta.” Id at 621 (Scalia concurring).
83 The usual view is that the lower courts are supposed to decide matters independently, but some features of the legal system openly embrace prediction, which probably occurs covertly even more frequently. See Caminker, 73 Tex L Rev at 8–22 (cited in note 58).
84 See, for example, Talk America, Inc v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 131 S Ct
2254, 2257 n 1, 2260–61, 2263–64 (2011) (deferring to the FCC’s view, as put forth in the
government’s amicus brief, and reversing the judgment). See also William N. Eskridge Jr
and Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency
Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Georgetown L J 1083, 1112, 1143
(2008) (noting instances of deference to agency inputs and observing that the “Court often requests that the Solicitor General submit an amicus brief”); Michael E. Solimine,
The Solicitor General Unbound: Amicus Curiae Activism and Deference in the Supreme
Court, 45 Ariz St L J 1183, 1212–14 (2013) (describing the influence that amicus briefs
filed by the solicitor general enjoy, and questioning the optimal level of deference); Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law’s Erie Doctrine, 101 Nw U L Rev 997,
1034–47 (2007) (explaining that the Court has increasingly invited agency views, and
arguing that courts should be required to give due consideration to agency amicus
briefs).
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authorities who administer the statute. In such a case, the decisions of the lower courts are not very relevant, because they
originated within an interpretive universe that has now expanded.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court and the lower courts could both
be right even if they reach opposite conclusions.
More fundamentally, it could be that the lower courts and
the Supreme Court—while all engaged in nominally the same
judicial activity—are actually engaged in quite different enterprises with different aims. For example, it might make sense for
the Supreme Court to regard itself as participating in a dialogue
with Congress and the executive branch, such that the Court’s
role is not to answer questions correctly and finally in the first
instance, but rather to spur other institutions of government into
action so that the system as a whole comes to a proper resolution of the matter.85 For lower courts, whose decisions are less
salient, such dynamics are more remote.86 As another possibility,
the Court’s rulings may need to take on a different, more managerial cast given its hierarchical position.87 More radically, one
might view the Court’s role, in certain kinds of cases, as that of a
tribunal of philosopher-kings who should decide the great questions before them on (possibly evolving) moral and prudential
grounds,88 quite unlike the lower courts, whose dominant role is
just to apply the rules laid down, umpire-like, to the discrete
disputes before them.
***
Considering all of these limitations, how powerful is the
epistemic argument? The fact that lower courts give weight to
85 See Bruhl, 97 Cornell L Rev at 459–62 (cited in note 45) (discussing democracyforcing and preference-eliciting approaches to judicial interpretation); Richard L. Hasen,
End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S Cal L
Rev 205, 210–13 (2013) (discussing interpretive doctrines premised on dialogue between
the courts and Congress). Dialogic approaches are easiest to appreciate in statutory matters, but such approaches can also apply in the constitutional sphere. See, for example,
Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 25–36
(Harvard 1999) (arguing that judicial minimalism in constitutional decisionmaking can
trigger beneficial democratic deliberation).
86 See text accompanying notes 102–04.
87 See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 Cornell
L Rev 1, 4, 59 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court should issue broad, clarifying rulings to provide guidance to the lower courts).
88 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 Harv L
Rev 31, 81–84 (2005) (describing the notion—which Judge Richard Posner associates
with Professor Alexander Bickel, among others—that the Supreme Court serves as the
nation’s “moral vanguard”).
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other lower courts’ views means that even a large consensus might
not represent as much wisdom as it seems. Moreover, the Supreme
Court operates in a more favorable environment in which to “find”
the law, further counteracting the lower courts’ numerical advantage. And in some cases, the lower courts and the Supreme Court
are not even addressing the same question. Taken together, all of
this significantly restricts the range of cases over which the
epistemic argument could operate, though it does not render the
argument totally impotent.
The uncertainties and contingencies involved in determining when to credit the epistemic argument create a further complication—namely, that the Supreme Court might not be able to
reliably determine when the preconditions for the epistemic argument are satisfied.89 At a certain point, it makes more sense
just to make an independent decision rather than to struggle
over whether and how much to defer.
B.

Modest Pragmatism

A second reason for the Supreme Court to attend to lowercourt precedent derives from a pragmatic concern about the consequences of different possible interpretations of the law. When
a certain view of the law has been established within a jurisdiction for some time, one can see how things have played out. The
lower courts, on this account, would act as laboratories conducting
a decentralized experiment. The Supreme Court could observe
the results and then, when the time comes, create national law
in a more practically informed way. The possibility of this sort of
experimentation and learning would provide one justification for
the Court’s practice of letting lower-court conflicts percolate for
a while before stepping in to resolve them.90

89 For a similar point in the context of judicial application of the Jury Theorem to
public opinion, see Andrew B. Coan, Well, Should They? A Response to If People Would
Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 Stan L Rev 213, 225 (2007).
90 See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 Harv L
Rev 4, 65 (1998) (noting “the possibility that the passage of time during which there is a
circuit split creates a record of the consequences of different legal regimes”). See also
Tom S. Clark and Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Supreme Court and Percolation in the
Lower Courts: An Optimal Stopping Model, 75 J Polit 150, 153 (2013) (providing a quantitative approach to the question of when the Supreme Court is likely to step in to resolve a circuit split); Doni Gewirtzman, Lower Court Constitutionalism: Circuit Court
Discretion in a Complex Adaptive System, 61 Am U L Rev 457, 481–89 (2012) (describing
various systemic benefits of allowing issues to percolate in the lower courts).
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The pragmatic argument comes in a few forms, some more
convincing than others. An ambitious version would have the
Supreme Court assess the results of the decentralized experiment and then choose the best interpretation as national law.
Yet one wonders whether the Court could reliably discern which
of several competing interpretations is generating better consequences. Additionally, the fact that the lower courts are divided
and the law uncertain might dampen the extent to which consequences manifest themselves.91
More modest forms of the pragmatic argument are more
plausible. For instance, suppose that most lower courts have
embraced a particular position for years, such that their rule has
been applied many times in many distinct factual contexts. If no
terrible consequences seem evident, one could conclude that the
prevailing view is at least workable, even if one could not confidently declare it better than any alternative. An untested view
would be riskier precisely because one could not be confident
that it would not cause serious problems.
An illustration of this form of modest pragmatism comes
from Tinklenberg, the Speedy Trial Act case discussed earlier.92
The Sixth Circuit had departed from the long-standing, widely
embraced view of the statute’s meaning.93 Justice Stephen Breyer’s
opinion for the Court listed a number of questions about how
courts could administer the Sixth Circuit’s novel rule.94 While allowing that courts could eventually find ways to overcome the
“administrative difficulties” that the Sixth Circuit’s approach
would generate, Breyer preferred the amply tested path that
other lower courts had already trod: “[A]ny such future strategies for administering the Sixth Circuit’s rule cannot provide a
present justification for turning the federal judicial system away
from the far less obstacle-strewn path that the system has long
traveled.”95 This type of reasoning might be attractive to consequentialist judges who are risk averse or who doubt their own
ability to accurately predict consequences. It is a satisficing
strategy (that is, it accepts “good enough,” rather than optimal,

91 See Kirtsaeng v John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 133 S Ct 1351, 1366 (2013) (noting that
the expected bad consequences of the competing interpretation adopted by some lower
courts had not appeared because the law had not been settled for long).
92 See text accompanying notes 3–7.
93 See Tinklenberg, 131 S Ct at 2014.
94 See id at 2014–15.
95 Id at 2015 (emphasis added).
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results)96 and also a form of status quo bias. One could also give
the argument an evolutionary or Burkean spin: if a certain view
has persisted over time in some or all jurisdictions, then it
probably represents some degree of good sense and practical adaptation.97
The kinds of consequences revealed by lower-court decisions
need not be limited to matters of judicial administrability such
as those involved in Tinklenberg. More broadly, the consequences
could include the public’s reactions to lower-court decisions on
contentious social matters such as same-sex marriage. In this
way, lower courts could act as a sort of “backlash” warning system.
It bears noting that the logic of modest pragmatism is flexible
enough that it could be invoked even in support of a minority
view, as long as the minority represents enough of a critical
mass and enough time has passed that one could detect any terrible consequences that would result from the view. The absence
of such consequences could then neutralize arguments that the
view at issue would lead to bad results if the Supreme Court
adopted it. In fact, the Supreme Court’s invocation of modest
pragmatism is by no means limited to situations in which it follows the majority of the lower courts.98
C.

Acquiescence

Another type of argument also relies on the fact that lowercourt decisions can convey or generate useful information for the
Supreme Court. In particular, there can sometimes be meaning
in silence. If Congress does not respond to an authoritative pronouncement about the meaning of a federal statute, one might
be inclined to take that silence as expressing a degree of congressional approval or at least acquiescence.99 The clearest cases
involve prior interpretations issued by the Supreme Court or a
96 See Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making
Processes in Administrative Organizations 118–20 (Free Press 4th ed 1997) (distinguishing
between maximizing and satisficing behavior).
97 Even Bentham, who otherwise mocks the notion of deferring to prior generations
(which necessarily lack our experience), explains that past practices are useful guides for
consequentialists. See Jeremy Bentham, Bentham’s Handbook of Political Fallacies 43–
45, 49–51 (Johns Hopkins 1952) (Harold A. Larrabee, ed).
98 See Part III.B.2.
99 See generally William N. Eskridge Jr, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 Mich
L Rev 67 (1988). The acquiescence argument differs from the situation in which the
Supreme Court uses lower-court decisions (along with other sources) to reconstruct the
legal background against which Congress legislated. See Part I.B. The acquiescence
argument concerns events that take place after enactment rather than before.
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federal administrative agency.100 Yet, in principle, the same argument applies to lower-court interpretations, at least when
they are numerous and reasonably long-standing such that they
represent, practically speaking, the law of the land.
Arguments based on congressional acquiescence are a bit
risky even under the best of circumstances. Inaction might reflect agreement on the part of successive Congresses, but it
could just as easily reflect the press of more important matters,
conflicting preferences about how to amend the statute, the absence of a majority large and powerful enough to overcome legislative inertia, and so forth.101 When the relevant precedents
come from the lower courts rather than from the Supreme
Court, the problems multiply. Congress is less familiar with the
decisional outputs of the courts of appeals, which is hardly surprising given that the lower courts decide many times more cases
and those decisions are, almost necessarily, less definitive.102
Even when Congress does become aware, that same lack of
(relative) importance and finality makes it less likely that a failure to respond reflects genuine endorsement.103 This is not to
deny that Congress does become aware of, and sometimes re100 See, for example, Bob Jones University v United States, 461 US 574, 599–602
(1983) (“Failure of Congress to modify the IRS rulings . . . make[s] out an unusually
strong case of legislative . . . ratification by implication.”); Flood v Kuhn, 407 US 258,
279–83 (1972) (noting several Supreme Court cases granting an antitrust exemption to
professional baseball and concluding from Congress’s silence that it “had no intention” to
overrule the Court).
101 See Eskridge, 87 Mich L Rev at 98–108 (cited in note 99). The hurdles to amending the Constitution, as opposed to a statute, are generally even greater, such that imputing congressional acquiescence in an interpretation is less justified in the former context than in the latter.
102 See Robert A. Katzmann, Courts and Congress 73–74 (Brookings 1997) (finding
that congressional staffers are generally unaware of statutory interpretation decisions in
lower courts unless an interest group had lobbied them for relief); William N. Eskridge
Jr, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale L J 331, 337 n
12, 415–16 (1991) (concluding that Congress is unaware of most lower-court decisions
and overrides them at a much lower rate than Supreme Court decisions); Stefanie A.
Lindquist and David A. Yalof, Congressional Responses to Federal Circuit Court Decisions, 85 Judicature 61, 68 (2001) (finding that Congress responds to a small percentage
of circuit court decisions). Congress does not have to read through all of the decisions, of
course; it can rely on interest groups to bring the few important decisions to its attention. See, for example, Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, Congressional
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am J Polit Sci 165, 165–67
(1984) (developing the police-patrol and fire-alarm models of congressional oversight of
the federal bureaucracy). But interest groups, just like Congress, should devote relatively
less effort to monitoring and demanding corrective action of the lower courts than the
Supreme Court.
103 See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of
Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 Mich L Rev 1, 82–86 (1994).
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spond to, lower-court precedents. 104 The soundness of an inference of acquiescence is always a matter of degree. But lowercourt interpretations that can realistically claim a congressional blessing—through some combination of salience, near
uniformity, and duration—should be rare among the sample of
cases that make their way onto the Supreme Court’s docket.105
Thus, although a complete accounting awaits Part II.G, it does
not appear that acquiescence arguments centered on lower-court
interpretations should play a major role in Supreme Court decisionmaking.
To be sure, it may be that one should understand acquiescence and other inaction-based arguments not as making factual
claims about actual congressional approval, but instead as making
a normatively inflected claim about the proper allocation of institutional functions in a democracy. That is, if a certain interpretation of the law has taken hold (through the work of whatever interpreting entity), the interpretation becomes engrafted
into the statute itself, such that the Supreme Court should treat
that interpretation as final unless Congress, which has constitutional primacy in statutory matters, displaces it.106 Buttressing
that democratic argument, one could add that the interpretation
should be allowed to stand since continuity and stability are institutional virtues, in large part because settled interpretations
engender private and public reliance.107 This is therefore an appropriate time to consider stability-based arguments more directly and to evaluate their force.

104 See Lindquist and Yalof, 85 Judicature at 63–68 (cited in note 102) (documenting
instances in which Congress responded to lower-court decisions).
105 For much the same reasons that congressional acquiescence usually provides little
reason for the Supreme Court to honor lower-court precedent, it has been argued that
lower courts should give their own statutory precedents less stare decisis effect. See Amy
Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 Geo Wash L Rev 317,
327–51 (2005).
106 See Shearson/American Express Inc v McMahon, 482 US 220, 268 (1987) (Stevens
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A]fter a statute has been construed, either
by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it
acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the
Congress itself.”); Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute
Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 Mich L Rev 177, 208–15 (1989) (arguing that, once a
statute has been interpreted by a reviewing court, further revisions are “basically legislative” because they are not strictly necessary to fill gaps in the text).
107 See Eskridge, 87 Mich L Rev at 110–11 (cited in note 99).
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D. Stability
Even if lower-court precedent did not convey any useful information to the Supreme Court, the very fact of its existence
might generate institutional reasons to honor it. One such potential reason is stability. Stability is a primary rule-of-law value108
and it forms a large part of the justification for following precedent.109 Stability is valuable for a number of reasons. It promotes
the equal treatment of similar litigants over time and, perhaps
most importantly, protects the interests of those who have ordered their affairs in reliance on a certain state of the law. Reliance is thus regarded as a critical consideration when a court is
deciding whether to overturn one of its own precedents instead
of following the norm of stare decisis.110
Although the most powerfully reliance-inducing federal
precedents come from the Supreme Court itself, a proper concern for the value of stability would require one to attend to any
settled law, regardless of its source.111 In their theory of law as
equilibrium, Professors Eskridge and Frickey include lowercourt consensus as one of the various sources that, especially
when combined with agency support and congressional acquiescence, can constitute a stable equilibrium worthy of the name
“law.”112 Eskridge and Frickey accordingly criticize the Supreme
Court for too lightly upsetting some interpretations that had
long prevailed in the lower courts.113 More recently, Professor
Hillel Levin has similarly explained that a reliance-focused approach to precedent should put some lower-court precedents on

108 See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 79–81 (Yale rev ed 1969) (describing constancy through time as an aspect of law’s internal morality); Federalist 62 (Madison), in
The Federalist 415, 420–22 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed) (arguing that frequent
changes in the law produce instability, make the law difficult to follow, and defeat the
point of self-governance).
109 See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan L Rev 571, 597–98, 601–02 (1987)
(describing the benefits of following precedent, including predictability and stability).
110 See, for example, Alleyne, 133 S Ct at 2164 (Sotomayor concurring); Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833, 855–56 (1992). See also
generally Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 Emory L J 1459 (2013) (discussing
the role of reliance in the doctrine of stare decisis).
111 See, for example, Anita S. Krishnakumar, Long-standing Agency Interpretations,
83 Fordham L Rev *36–38 (forthcoming 2015), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2224066 (visited Aug 12, 2014) (arguing that courts should afford
extra deference to particularly long-standing agency interpretations, in part for reasons
of reliance and stability).
112 See Eskridge and Frickey, 108 Harv L Rev at 76–81 (cited in note 31).
113 See id at 80–81.
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or near the same level as Supreme Court precedents for stare
decisis purposes.114
Without denying that stability can provide a reason for the
Supreme Court to consider the views of lower courts, the stability argument has its limits. To begin with, the potential for disruption and unfairness is worst when all or virtually all of the
lower courts have been doing things the same way for a long
time. Yet legal questions that have generated a long-standing
consensus in the lower courts are, given the Court’s certiorari
priorities, unlikely to be reviewed. The clearest cases for adhering
to lower-court precedent are thus uncommon at the merits stage.
How does the stability rationale fare in the more common
scenario of division among the lower courts? If the lower courts
are closely divided, stability probably would not have much of a
role to play once the Court has decided to grant certiorari, as
there will be some disruption either way. However, if the lower
courts are divided in a lopsided fashion, then stability could carry
some weight. True, the mere existence of a division of authority
and the lack of a Supreme Court decision probably somewhat
reduce the extent to which people would regard the law as firmly
settled and rely on it.115 Nonetheless, strictly from the stability
perspective, going with the majority view seems less disruptive
in that fewer affected persons would have to change their conduct, learn new law, or have their expectations upset. A further
wrinkle, however, is that the circuits differ in terms of population. The Ninth Circuit contains about 20 percent of the country’s population. A “minority” view held by the Ninth Circuit
governs more of the country’s population than a “majority” view
held by less populous circuits like the First, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits, which contain fewer people combined than the Ninth
Circuit alone.116 Yet, strangely, it does not appear that the
114 See Hillel Y. Levin, A Reliance Approach to Precedent, 47 Ga L Rev 1035, 1074–
78 (2013); Hillel Y. Levin, Contemporary Meaning and Expectations in Statutory Interpretation, 2012 U Ill L Rev 1103, 1141–42.
115 It is actually quite hard to know how circuit conflicts affect the regulated public’s
understanding of what the governing law is and how to order their affairs. For an
attempt to gauge this through surveys and interviews of lawyers, see Arthur D. Hellman,
Light on a Darkling Plain: Intercircuit Conflicts in the Perspective of Time and Experience,
1998 S Ct Rev 247, 266–99. Further complicating matters, the extent of reliance may
depend on the Supreme Court’s practices: if it disregards even long-standing and nearly
unanimous lower-court precedent, people should not rely on such precedents very much,
which then further justifies the Court’s disregard of them.
116 See US Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts, online at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html (visited Aug 12, 2014). If one wanted to be
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Supreme Court shows special solicitude to the views of the
Ninth Circuit. Perhaps the Court is wrong in this respect.
Another complication with stability arguments is that the
value of preserving some stable, settled view depends on the
question at issue. True, any change in the law involves some
transition costs, such as the burden of learning the new law, updating legal materials, and so forth.117 But some kinds of changes
are much more disruptive than others. A decision upsetting
common and entrenched business practices—such as a decision
extending the antitrust laws to previously unregulated conduct,118 or a decision changing the tax treatment of capital investments—could seriously interfere with citizens’ primary conduct and destroy the value of certain assets and expectations,
especially given that judicial decisions are typically applied retroactively.
Other categories of legal questions are unlikely to involve
serious reliance problems, even when the lower courts have been
consistent. The Court’s stare decisis jurisprudence proceeds on
the premise that evidentiary and procedural rulings, unlike
those bearing on property and contract rights, are unlikely to
involve serious reliance costs.119 In the main, that seems right,
and so there will usually not be serious reliance-related reasons
to honor the views of lower courts in such matters.120 Even apart
from that, the damage to reliance interests might depend on the
direction of the legal change; particularly worrisome are scenarios
involving decisions that expand the scope of liability.
Taking all of these considerations together, stability will
rarely provide a strong reason for the Supreme Court to attend
even more precise, one could consider not total population, but instead the size of the
affected subset of the population. For example, upsetting the Tenth Circuit’s position on
a question of federal Indian law could be more disruptive than upsetting the law of a
more populous circuit that contains fewer tribes.
117 See generally Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L
Rev 789 (2002) (cataloguing various types of legal transition costs).
118 See, for example, Toolson v New York Yankees, Inc, 346 US 356, 357 (1953)
(maintaining the antitrust exemption for baseball because overruling it would upset decades of development undertaken in reliance on the exemption).
119 See, for example, Payne v Tennessee, 501 US 808, 828 (1991) (“Considerations in
favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights,
where reliance interests are involved; the opposite is true in cases . . . involving procedural and evidentiary rules.”) (citations omitted).
120 It is not universally the case that procedural and evidentiary changes do not involve serious reliance interests. See Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine,
67 Wash & Lee L Rev 411, 447 (2010) (providing the example of the law of attorneyclient privilege).
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to the lower courts. The scenarios in which the argument is
strongest—when the lower courts have overwhelmingly embraced a particular view for a long time—are also the scenarios
in which the Court is least likely to grant review. When the
Court does take such a case, the argument for attending to a
lower-court consensus is often strong, particularly when reversal
would risk serious damage to reliance interests. But in other
cases the Court should feel little hesitation about upsetting even
what was very settled law. In Padilla v Kentucky,121 for example,
the Supreme Court overturned the virtually unanimous view of
the state and lower federal courts by holding that the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel extends to
advice about the immigration consequences of pleading guilty.122
Yet this break with precedent did not hold much disruptive potential. For one thing, prevailing professional norms already
required such advice even though the Constitution did not.123
For another, various practical and procedural obstacles would
likely prevent large numbers of old convictions from being
overturned.124
E.

Compliance

Although not a prominent part of the official doctrine, another
group of potential institutional reasons for the Supreme Court to
follow lower-court precedent involves compliance. If the Court
rules in accord with what most of the lower courts are already
doing, it can be fairly confident that they will keep doing as they
have done. Further, if enough lower courts have decided a
question, the majority of that sample should reflect the latent
majority inclination of the others.125

121

130 S Ct 1473 (2010).
Id at 1481–82 & n 9, 1487 (Alito concurring in the judgment) (noting that the
decision was contrary to “the long-standing and unanimous position of the federal
courts”).
123 See id at 1482, 1485; Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, et al, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Padilla v Kentucky, Docket No 08651, *9–21 (US filed June 2, 2009) (available on Westlaw at 2009 WL 1567356).
124 See Padilla, 130 S Ct at 1485–86. See also Chaidez v United States, 133 S Ct
1103, 1107–11 (2013) (holding that Padilla did not apply retroactively).
125 See Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem,
31 J Legal Stud 327, 332–33 (2002) (discussing the “polling model” of the Jury Theorem).
The compliance-centric argument in the text is not making a utilitarian point that the
Court can satisfy the most preferences by agreeing with the lower-court majority. One
could make such an argument, but it is unclear why satisfying lower-court preferences
122
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A concern about judicial compliance might seem strange or
even perverse, given that the Supreme Court sits at the top of
the hierarchy and has the power to reverse. (By contrast, worries about resistance by nonjudicial actors are more familiar.126)
But the power relationship between the Supreme Court and
lower courts is a bit more complicated than that. The lower judiciary is large, and its output is immense compared to the Supreme
Court’s limited capacity to supervise. If the lower courts decided
to engage in serious, widespread, and sustained defiance, the
Supreme Court would not have enough writs of mandamus to
keep them in line. More than that, the Supreme Court affirmatively needs the lower courts to implement, enforce, and flesh
out the relatively few rulings that it does issue so as to make
them the actual law of the land.127 The need to ensure some degree of lower-court buy-in provides a reason for the Supreme
Court to go along with what the lower courts already want.
Why would lower courts fail to comply with new Supreme
Court precedents? Like many organizations, courts are conservative and inertial; indeed, courts in particular are supposed to
be institutionally conservative (in the sense of favoring continuity over change).128 Thus, they sometimes read Supreme Court
decisions so as to unsettle as little existing law as possible.129
Beyond that sort of inertial resistance, there could be some topics
about which feelings on the substantive merits run high enough
that purposeful resistance is a real prospect.130 One thinks of
hot-button social issues like school prayer, desegregation and

(whatever that means) would be especially valuable (as compared to aiming to maximize
overall social welfare).
126 See, for example, Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 349 US 294, 301 (1955)
(ordering that desegregation proceed not immediately, but “with all deliberate speed”).
See also Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale L J 585, 609–14 (1983) (explaining
that the Court chose the “all deliberate speed” formulation in order to reduce anticipated
resistance by states, school districts, and segregationists).
127 See Patricia M. Wald, Upstairs/Downstairs at the Supreme Court: Implications
of the 1991 Term for the Constitutional Work of the Lower Courts, 61 U Cin L Rev 771,
778, 799 (1993).
128 See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67
NYU L Rev 921, 925 (1992).
129 See, for example, Brannon P. Denning and Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 Ark
L Rev 1253, 1253–57, 1299–1310 (2003) (charting the tepid response of the lower courts
to new limitations on the Commerce Clause).
130 See Sara C. Benesh and Wendy L. Martinek, Context and Compliance: A Comparison of State Supreme Courts and the Circuits, 93 Marq L Rev 795, 795 n 1 (2009)
(citing dozens of scholarly works on lower-court compliance).
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busing, and the death penalty. Less obviously, one might consider
issues like mandatory arbitration and access to the civillitigation system, fields in which the Supreme Court’s decisions
have recently met resistance in certain precincts of the judiciary.131
Nonetheless, without totally dismissing the notion that the
Supreme Court might sometimes follow the lower courts in order
to improve compliance, it seems unlikely to occur very often. Inertia is real, but most lower courts will try to adjust course, even
if they do not turn on a dime. As for the possibility of more active resistance, in most cases the lower courts’ preferences are
not so intense that trying to accommodate them would provide a
major reason for choosing one view over another. Lower-court
judges might have their own views on whether a floating home
is a “vessel” according to the definition in 1 USC § 3,132 but most
of them will not go to the barricades over it. When preferences
are intense, they are likely to be intense on the Supreme Court
too, such that the justices would not be willing to change their
views as an accommodation.
Moreover, when compliance is a real concern, the Supreme
Court has other strategies at its disposal besides agreeing with
the larger group of lower courts. The Court can use hard-edged
rules rather than flexible standards, as the former are typically
thought to constrain more effectively and to make it easier to detect noncompliance.133 It can shift the locus of decisionmaking
authority, as has arguably happened with the Federal Arbitration
Act,134 in regard to which the Supreme Court has taken
decisionmaking opportunities away from courts, especially state
courts, and given them over to private arbitrators.135 And there
is always the fact that certiorari is discretionary, which provides

131 See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and
the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 NYU L Rev 1420, 1432–36, 1456–63 (2008).
See also Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC v Howard, 133 S Ct 500, 503 (2012) (per curiam)
(vacating a state court decision that “disregard[ed]” Supreme Court precedents and
evinced “hostility” toward arbitration).
132 That was the question at issue in Lozman v City of Riviera Beach, Florida, 133 S
Ct 735, 739 (2013).
133 See, for example, Toby J. Heytens, Doctrine Formulation and Distrust, 83 Notre
Dame L Rev 2045, 2048–49 (2008); Tonja Jacobi and Emerson H. Tiller, Legal Doctrine
and Political Control, 23 J L, Econ & Org 326, 339 (2007).
134 9 USC § 1 et seq.
135 See Bruhl, 83 NYU L Rev at 1470 (cited in note 131).
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the Court with the option of withdrawing from the scene and letting the divided lower courts do as they wish.136
All in all, worries about lower-court compliance are, and
should be, quite low on the list of the Court’s concerns.
F.

Constraint

The debate over interpretive methodology remains obsessed
with the quest for objectivity.137 Originalists and textualists in
particular seem fixated on constraining the willful judge who
would import his or her own preferences into legal texts rather
than neutrally apply the law.138 And yet evidence from actual judicial practice casts doubt on originalists’ and textualists’ claims
that careful analyses of language and textual canons have much
constraining effect.139
If one really wants constraint, the lower courts furnish a
way to achieve it. Instead of reaching its own decisions on the
merits, the Supreme Court could simply tally up the “votes” of
the lower courts—five circuits say the statute means X, two say
the opposite—and declare which position has the most supporters.
Thus could we fulfill the dream of justices as umpires or, more
accurately in this vision, as scorekeepers.
The vision of the Supreme Court as scorekeeper is mostly a
thought experiment, but it is not totally without appeal. Among
the Court’s essential functions, on many accounts, is to act as
the ultimate adjudicator of the meaning of federal law.140 That
settlement function does not depend on the content of the
Court’s decisions; in principle, the Court could settle the law by
flipping a coin. Of course, according to the epistemic rationale
discussed earlier, the majority view of the lower courts should be
136 Compare the withdrawal option with McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S Cal L Rev 1631, 1641–47 (1995)
(developing a theory of doctrine formation according to which the Supreme Court expands
the range of acceptable lower-court decisions in the face of substantial noncompliance).
137 See Frank B. Cross, The Theory and Practice of Statutory Interpretation 19–22
(Stanford 2009) (identifying constraint as a key concern motivating disputes about interpretive theory).
138 See, for example, Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 9–28 (West 2012); Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword, in Scalia
and Garner, Reading Law xxi, xxii–xxiii (cited in note 138).
139 See Cross, Theory and Practice of Statutory Interpretation at 166, 175–79 (cited
in note 137); James J. Brudney and Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 Vand L Rev 1, 6, 57–60 (2005).
140 See, for example, Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 Harv L Rev 1359, 1377 (1997).
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of a higher quality than the outcome one would get from flipping
a coin. (The more faith one reposes in the Jury Theorem as an
apt model for how the lower courts work, or the more one could
shift the lower courts toward satisfying the Theorem’s conditions, such as by weakening intercircuit deference, the happier
one should be with treating lower-court outputs as binding.)
Additionally, the model of Court-as-scorekeeper should make it
easier for the Court to decide cases, so that the Court could settle more conflicts than it does today.
Still, even granting that constraint is an important goal,
this is probably not the sort of constraint that many people have
in mind. Justice Antonin Scalia may champion the importance of
constrained decisionmaking, but he has expressly rejected the
notion that the Court does or should elevate certainty and objectivity to such a degree that the Court simply ratifies lower-court
consensus.141 In this he is surely not alone. It would seem rather
bizarre to have nine justices, a marble building, and all the rest if
the Court’s highest function were to serve as a glorified tabulator.
Further, the scorekeeper model, if openly announced, would
cause trouble in the lower courts. Presumably they should still
decide cases on the merits, rather than by counting noses. (Or
would the courts of appeals count up district court decisions? If
so, then the content of federal law would be left to courts at the
bottom of the pyramid, which inhabit the least favorable environment for deciding questions of law.142) The stakes in the
courts of appeals would be high in the early stages of a conflict,
when it would still be unclear which view would come to represent the majority. Judges might rush to decide questions in order to amplify their influence. But then, once a clear winning
position emerged, lower courts would jump on the bandwagon,
as independent decisionmaking would waste time and generate
(what would soon be declared to be) error. For these and other
reasons, it may be that candidly announcing a policy of following
the lower courts would change their behavior in such a way that
one would no longer want to follow them.143

141

See Brogan v United States, 522 US 398, 407–08 (1998).
See Salve Regina College v Russell, 499 US 225, 232 (1991) (explaining that appellate courts are structurally superior to trial courts at correctly deciding questions of law).
143 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation
in Criminal Law, 97 Harv L Rev 625, 632–34 (1984) (exploring the possibility that lessthan-candid communications between decisionmakers and the regulated audience can
serve worthy social ends).
142
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G. Summary and Examples
1. When should the lower courts matter most and when
should they matter least?
As set out above, there are a number of distinct reasons for
the Supreme Court to give weight to the views of lower courts.
The views of the lower courts might shed light on the truth of
the matter, for example, or they may simply represent a status
quo that it would be unwise to upset. As we have also seen, however, some of the rationales are more powerful than others, and
all of them have their limits. It is time to bring the different
strands of the analysis together and see if there are any broader
conclusions to be drawn. I see three such conclusions, which concern the size of the lower-court majority, its duration, and the
type of legal question involved.
First, and probably most clearly, the force of the case for following lower courts depends on how decisively the lower courts
have settled on one view over another. If the lower courts have
overwhelmingly ruled one particular way, that will often provide
a good reason to endorse that view, but a narrower majority
should rarely merit the Supreme Court’s respect. This is so for a
few reasons. To begin with, the stability argument is quite powerful when most courts (including, to add more nuance, the
courts that represent the bulk of the regulated public) have
adopted one view, but it has little force when any Supreme
Court decision on the merits would change the law in much of
the country anyway. Acquiescence, though rarely a powerful
argument even in the case of lower-court consensus, loses practically all its force when the lower courts are so closely divided
that there is no single view in which Congress could acquiesce. I
have explained why the epistemic argument has limited scope,
but it is more powerful the more unevenly the lower courts are
divided. It is true that on the constraint rationale—according to
which the Supreme Court should simply declare the majority
view the winner—even a narrow advantage makes a winner, but
exalting the bare value of constraint per se fits too poorly with
our current practices to be very persuasive.
Second, and for somewhat similar reasons, duration matters. The duration of lower-court views clearly matters on the
stability rationale, because reliance interests grow as law becomes more entrenched. Arguments based on pragmatism also
require that some time has passed, in order to let consequences
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manifest themselves. Duration plausibly counts as a plus factor
on the acquiescence rationale and the compliance rationale,
though the latter in particular should not carry much weight in
any event. Duration seems ambiguous on the epistemic rationale, in the sense that one can come up with stories that cut either way.
Third—and here there is more to say—the type of question
before the Court matters. The Court should be less willing to follow lower-court views in constitutional cases than in cases involving statutory interpretation and common law. There are
several reasons for this. To begin with, the optimal balance between the values of judicial accuracy and judicial settlement differs because of the divergent legislative roles across the two contexts.144 Although one should hesitate before concluding that
Congress has blessed a particular judicial interpretation
through inaction,145 legislative revision of statutory interpretations and common law is at least a real possibility. Additionally,
legislatures can provide reliance-protecting transitional relief
that courts often cannot. These factors provide some reason for
the Supreme Court to adhere to settled lower-court positions in
nonconstitutional domains. By contrast, were the Supreme
Court to embrace an erroneous constitutional position by following
the lower courts, correction via the onerous Article V amendment process would be the only nonjudicial remedy.
An additional reason why lower-court decisions should carry
less weight in constitutional cases is that judicial decisionmaking in constitutional cases looks quite different at different levels
of the hierarchy. Virtually every field of constitutional law is
thick with Supreme Court precedent. Statutory cases tend to be
less cluttered with precedent, if for no other reason than the
vast number of statutes—with new ones always cropping up and
old ones being amended—which means that the Supreme Court
can address only a fraction of the interpretive questions. Lowercourt decisionmaking in constitutional cases is therefore especially doctrinal in character, focusing largely on parsing the
holdings (and dicta) of prior Supreme Court cases.146 The Supreme
144 For a similar observation regarding the Court’s willingness to overrule its own
decisions, see Burnet v Coronado Oil & Gas Co, 285 US 393, 406–08 (1932) (Brandeis
dissenting).
145 See Part II.C.
146 See Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 Harv L
Rev 145, 150 (2008) (“[I]n many cases lower courts are not even trying to directly engage
the Constitution, but are instead simply parsing the Court’s case law—something that
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Court’s own constitutional decisionmaking, in contrast, has a
freer character, because the Court can overrule its precedents
and more easily disregard inconvenient dicta.147 Thus, it is especially common in constitutional cases for the question in the
Supreme Court to look different, and more open, than the question appeared in the lower courts. To the extent that the Supreme
Court is engaged in a different enterprise than the lower judiciary, the value of attending to the latter’s decisions declines, especially on the epistemic rationale.
To be sure, from time to time the lower courts do address a
constitutional question on a relatively blank slate. In such cases,
lower courts often (though not always) turn to originalism. A
leading recent example of lower-court originalism is the DC Circuit’s decision invalidating President Barack Obama’s recess
appointments to the National Labor Relations Board.148 The
court’s opinion endeavored to find the original meaning of the
relevant constitutional text and relied heavily on early history,
eschewing more recent practice and sister-circuit precedents.149
Originalism is an interpretive method that might ask too much of
all judges—even those assisted by the most-able clerks and mosterudite historical amicus briefs150—but the method is especially
difficult in resource-constrained lower courts. This is another
reason why the lower courts are relatively less likely to have
useful input in constitutional cases.
Although the discussion so far has grouped common law
and statutory law together, distinguishing both of them from
constitutional law, it may be that common law cases (to the extent
the Court thinks it can usually do quite well on its own, thank you.”); Sanford Levinson,
On Positivism and Potted Plants: “Inferior” Judges and the Task of Constitutional Interpretation, 25 Conn L Rev 843, 849–50 (1993). This is not to deny the heavy emphasis on
doctrine and precedential analysis even in the Supreme Court. See Amar, 122 Harv L
Rev at 147 (cited in note 146); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U Chi L Rev 877, 883–84 (1996). The balance between different modes of analysis is a matter of degrees, not absolutes.
147 See, for example, Central Virginia Community College v Katz, 546 US 356, 363
(2006). See also Knox v Service Employees International Union, Local 1000, 132 S Ct
2277, 2299 (2012) (Sotomayor concurring in the judgment) (charging the majority with
recharacterizing an “explicit holding” as an “offhand remark”).
148 See Noel Canning v NLRB, 705 F3d 490, 514 (DC Cir 2013).
149 See Noel Canning, 705 F3d at 500–02, 505–12.
150 Even some judges have acknowledged that sophisticated historical research may
be beyond their ken. See, for example, McDonald v City of Chicago, Illinois, 130 S Ct
3020, 3121–22 (2010) (Breyer dissenting); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Cosmic Constitutional
Theory: Why Americans Are Losing Their Inalienable Right to Self-Governance 50–52
(Oxford 2012).
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that they find their way to the Supreme Court) present a special
jurisprudential reason for deference to lower-court majorities.
When a court considers the meaning of a statute or a constitutional provision, the court seems to aim at something outside of
the judicial system, something that other courts have previously
aimed at but have not themselves defined through their very
acts of deciding. But if one wants to know what the common law
is, the fact that most courts have for some time said that the law
is X comes closer to establishing that X truly is the law. Now, to
be clear, the preceding sentences contain a number of highly
contestable jurisprudential propositions: a realist-inspired view
could deny that any type of law has an external existence, while
an opposing view could insist that even the common law is merely
discovered by courts rather than created by them.151 Nonetheless, there is a palpable and plausible sense in which judicial decisions create the common law in a way that they do not in other
domains. If so, the Supreme Court has more reason to attend to
lower-court precedent in common law cases than in others. Even
Justice Scalia, in an opinion generally rejecting the maxim
communis error facit jus (that is, the idea that common error
can, by virtue of its prevalence, constitute law), accepted the notion that common opinion essentially is the common law.152
***
To summarize, then, the views of the lower courts have their
greatest force when the lower courts have decisively and for a
long time embraced a particular view of the law, particularly on
matters of common law and statutory interpretation, and especially when there has been reliance. Many such situations arise
at the certiorari stage, and usually the Court should and does
deny review. At the merits stage, such circumstances will therefore appear fairly rarely, and so there will be relatively few cases
in which the views of the lower courts should loom large in the
Court’s reasoning—though there will be some. Part III will
provide a more concrete sense of how many such cases there are
and how the Court responds to them.
151 See William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 69–70 (Legal
Classics spec ed 1983) (“[S]ubsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to
vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For if it be found that the former decision
is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law, but
that it was not law.”).
152 See Brogan, 522 US at 407 n 3, 408.
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2. Examples.
Some examples may be helpful in illustrating the circumstances in which the lower courts should or should not exert influence. For a recent example of a case in which the Supreme
Court should have, but did not, follow a lower-court consensus,
consider Taniguchi v Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd.153 Federal law
provides that prevailing parties may recover the costs of a lawsuit,
which are defined to include “compensation of interpreters.”154
The question before the Court was whether such compensation
includes costs associated with document translation as well as
the more obviously included oral translations. Almost all of the
lower courts to have considered the question had said yes, but
the majority of the Supreme Court answered no.155 The dissent—
penned by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and joined by Justices
Breyer and Sotomayor—argued that allowing the costs of written translation was at least a permissible interpretation of the
text, furthered the statutory purposes, and comported with the
lower-court consensus.156 The dissent’s call for downward deference in this case drew support from several distinct rationales.
First of all, although there admittedly does not appear to be a
good private-reliance argument—nobody orders their primary
conduct based on whether they would later be able to recover
translation costs in a lawsuit—there is a governmental-reliance
argument stemming from the fact that more than a dozen federal
courts had provided for the recovery of translation services in their
local rules or the like.157 Further, Congress did not upset these
long-standing practices—and arguably blessed them—when it
amended the relevant statute.158 From the perspective of the
pragmatic rationale, this long-standing interpretation had not
revealed serious practical difficulties.159 Finally, the epistemic argument seems relatively strong here given the size of the lowercourt majority and the topic: a question of trial practice that
lower courts arguably understand better than the Supreme
Court.

153
154
155
156
157
158
159

132 S Ct 1997 (2012).
Id at 1999–2000, quoting 28 USC § 1920(6).
See Taniguchi, 132 S Ct at 2007; id at 2008 (Ginsburg dissenting).
See id at 2008–10 (Ginsburg dissenting).
See id at 2009 n 2 (Ginsburg dissenting).
See id at 2008–09 (Ginsburg dissenting).
See Taniguchi, 132 S Ct at at 2010–11 (Ginsburg dissenting).

01 BRUHL_ART_SOFTA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

892

The University of Chicago Law Review

9/5/14 11:21 AM

[81:851

For a prominent example of a case in which there was very little reason to follow the lower courts, consider National Federation
of Independent Business v Sebelius,160 the 2012 case addressing
the constitutional challenge to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.161 A majority of the courts of appeals to consider the constitutionality of the individual mandate upheld it as
a valid exercise of the commerce power,162 but all of the lower-court
decisions were necessarily very recent, so nothing like a settled
view had developed. Nor had enough time passed to observe the
consequences of the different approaches, especially since the
mandate itself was not even scheduled to take effect for a few
years.163 Finally, the fact that this case touched on constitutional
questions of tremendous moment means that the lower courts
were unlikely to offer much useful guidance.164 And so, although
the Court did end up agreeing with the lower-court majority that
the mandate was constitutional—though, famously, because it
was a tax rather than a regulation of “commerce”165—there is no
reason to think that the lower courts’ decisions should have had
any authoritative value. (Further, given the political stakes in
the case, it is hard to imagine that the Supreme Court would
have followed the lower courts even if it should have.)
As the previously discussed case of Padilla v Kentucky
shows, sometimes even an overwhelming consensus of the lower
courts merits little respect. As observed earlier, there was no
serious reliance problem with overturning the settled law in
Padilla.166 But neither did the lower-court consensus require
deference based on other rationales. In a constitutional case
such as this, acquiescence has little relevance, and the lower
courts’ parsing of the implications of the Supreme Court’s prior
decisions holds little value for the Supreme Court itself.

160

132 S Ct 2566 (2012) (“NFIB”).
Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010).
162 One court of appeals struck down the mandate on the merits, two upheld it on
the merits, and one declined to reach the question on jurisdictional grounds. NFIB, 132 S
Ct at 2581.
163 See id at 2580, quoting 26 USC § 5000A(b)(1) (noting that penalties for noncompliance with the mandate would begin in 2014).
164 See, for example, Thomas More Law Center v Obama, 651 F3d 529, 559 (6th Cir
2011) (Sutton concurring in part) (explaining that “the Supreme Court has considerable
discretion in resolving this dispute [over the ACA],” but that “lower court judges [have]
the duty to respect the language and direction of the Court’s precedents”).
165 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2608 (Roberts) (plurality).
166 See notes 123–24 and accompanying text.
161
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III. DESCRIBING AND MEASURING THE CURRENT SUPREME
COURT’S PRACTICES
With the benefit of the theoretical framework and categories developed above, let us now consider the Supreme
Court’s practices.
Some years ago, Professor Arthur Hellman described the
apparent emergence of an “Olympian” Supreme Court that was
in various respects quite different from, and detached from, the
more ordinary courts below it.167 One way in which such aloof
detachment can manifest itself is through an indifference toward
the lower courts’ struggles to resolve the difficult questions that
eventually find their way onto the Supreme Court’s docket. And,
indeed, the impression of some informed observers is that the
Supreme Court has, for at least the last few decades, not cared
much about the views of the lower courts. In 1998, one of the nation’s most accomplished appellate litigators wrote that the
Supreme Court was “less concerned about lower-court precedent
than at anytime in the twenty years that I have been watching
this Court. The only real precedent that matters to this Supreme
Court is this Court’s precedent.”168 Some lower-court judges,
writing at around the same time, shared that assessment.169
Similarly, Professors Eskridge and Frickey, in their study of the
Court’s 1993 Term, discerned a tendency for the Court to disregard settled law—including long-standing lower-court precedent—in the pursuit of a dogmatic form of textualism that elevated idiosyncratic readings of text over rule-of-law values like
stability and predictability.170 All of these observers were well informed, but it would be valuable to consider the situation today

167 Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 S Ct Rev
403, 432–38.
168 Carter G. Phillips, Advocacy before the United States Supreme Court, 15 Cooley L
Rev 177, 180 (1998).
169 Consider the impression of Judge Patricia Wald of the DC Circuit, who in 1993
observed “little indication the Justices found in [lower-court] decisions a prolific source of
analyses or insights. . . . One senses that the Justices are, more and more, reacting to
each other and to the implications of their decisions rather than drawing on the wisdom
of lower court rationales.” Wald, 61 U Cin L Rev at 792 (cited in note 127). Writing twenty
years before that, Judge Friendly saw things similarly but was less troubled by the possibility that the Supreme Court would mostly overlook the lower courts’ insights: “If a
case involves questions of federal law of such importance as to be reviewed by the Supreme
Court, the views of the court of appeals count, and should count, for little.” Henry J.
Friendly, The “Law of the Circuit” and All That: Foreword to the Second Circuit 1970
Term, 46 St John’s L Rev 406, 407 (1972).
170 See Eskridge and Frickey, 108 Harv L Rev at 76–81 (cited in note 30).
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and, if possible, to provide an account that is more systematic.
Are the lower courts an important input in contemporary Supreme
Court decisionmaking? To the extent that the lower courts do
matter, which of the rationales explored in Part II do the current
justices find persuasive?
To answer those questions, I set out to investigate, in both
qualitative and quantitative terms, the current Supreme Court’s
use of lower-court precedent. Although some of my research and
conclusions cover longer periods, I focus most heavily on three
recent Supreme Court terms that cover the period from October
2010 through June 2013. These terms capture the first three
years of the Court as currently constituted—that is, since Justice
Kagan replaced Justice Stevens. I used a combination of various
approaches, including running word searches in electronic databases and skimming every case from those years to look for results that the search terms may have missed.171
I investigated both what the Court does (voting) and what it
says (reasoning). Both inquiries are important. Relying simply
on what the Court says in its opinions is obviously risky, as the
Court might use lower-court opinions opportunistically, invoking
them when it is convenient but ignoring them when they stand
in the way. Or perhaps the Court is influenced without acknowledging it. Yet focusing solely on counting votes creates a problem of causal interpretation: if the Court usually agrees with the
majority of the lower courts on an issue, that need not indicate
any deference or even influence but may just prove that the
law supplies a pretty clearly correct answer that most jurists
171 More precisely, I emphasized different approaches for different aspects of the
study. For Part III.A’s analysis of how the Supreme Court ruled in circuit splits, I
skimmed every opinion looking for mention of how the lower courts were divided. I also
electronically searched each opinion for citations to the Federal Reporter (that is, “F.”) to
assist in this task. For Part III.B, which examines invocations of the lower courts in the
Supreme Court’s reasoning, I relied primarily on word searches in the Westlaw Supreme
Court database. I first ran the following search: “(universal! or uniform! or consensus or
every or majority or most or unanim! or minority or bulk or practice or numerous or all
or other or almost or settled) /s (“lower court” or circuit or “other court” or “court of appeals” or “other judge” or “state court” or “state supreme court” or “state high court”).” I
then followed up with searches targeted at particular rationales for invoking the lower
courts, using terms like “acquiesc!” and “consequence.” All of these database searches
were substantially overinclusive, returning many false positives that had to be eliminated.
But because the Court need not use any particular formula of words when it relies on
lower-court precedent, nor even cite particular decisions, no word search can catch every
instance, so skimming all of the decisions caught some additional cases. Despite the multiple approaches, I certainly cannot rule out having missed some relevant invocations of
the lower courts.
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independently select.172 Ideally, one would perform an experiment in which the Supreme Court is blinded to what happened
in the lower courts. If the rate of agreement decreased in the
blinded condition, that would provide some evidence of causal
influence. Unfortunately, no such experiment seems possible.
But perhaps what the Court says about lower-court precedent
can help us decide which interpretation of the facts—influence
or mere coincidental correspondence—is correct. While acknowledging the limits of any particular type of evidence, we might
gain some confidence in our conclusions if we are able to combine multiple strands of qualitative and quantitative evidence,
along with a convincing jurisprudential account of the findings.
The investigation of the Court’s practices yielded a variety
of findings, some expected and some more surprising. I recount
them below, beginning with the Supreme Court’s voting behavior.
Then I turn to the Supreme Court’s statements and attempt to
identify and categorize every instance since the appointment of
Justice Kagan three years ago in which the Supreme Court has
invoked the support of lower courts.
A.

The Court’s Voting Behavior

Although it is widely recognized that the Supreme Court
issues far more reversals than affirmances—it reversed in
around 70–75 percent of the cases argued before it in recent
years173—that simple observation actually tells us very little about
how often the Court agrees with the lower courts. When the
Court reverses the decision directly under review, the Court
might be indirectly “affirming” several other courts that had
come out on the other side of the legal question at issue. Indeed,
the decision being reversed might have represented the minority
view in the lower courts. A more meaningful measure of the
Court’s behavior would take this phenomenon of indirect or

172 See, for example, Tinklenberg, 131 S Ct at 2018 (Scalia concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment):

The clarity of the text is doubtless why, as the Court’s opinion points out, every
Circuit disagrees with the [decision under review]. That is the direction in
which the causality proceeds: Clarity of text produces unanimity of Circuits—
not, as the Court’s opinion would have it, unanimity of Circuits clarifies text.
(citation omitted).
173 Lee Epstein, et al, The Supreme Court Compendium: Data, Decisions, and Developments 271 (Sage 5th ed 2012).
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parallel review into account, and several scholars have recently
published studies that attempt to do so.174
To briefly summarize some key findings from that literature:
Professors Stefanie Lindquist and David Klein, in a methodologically sophisticated study of circuit-conflict cases from 1985–95,
found that the justices were more likely to vote for a particular
position as the relative support in the lower courts for that position increased.175 Studies of circuit splits from more recent years
reach similar conclusions. Although the precise figures vary depending on the years studied and the methodology employed,
these measures show that the Supreme Court tends to resolve
splits by siding with the majority of the circuits.176
If the goal is to investigate the potential influence of lower
courts (versus mere independent correspondence of results), not
all splits are equally informative. When the circuits are closely
divided on some issue, splitting 3–2 or 7–5, it is hard to see why
that would provide much reason for the Supreme Court to agree
with the slight majority. Such a close division hardly represents
any clear consensus but rather just suggests that the question
involved is particularly difficult. Nor could one accuse the Court
of upsetting a settled equilibrium whichever way it ruled. It is
therefore particularly worth examining the Court’s handling of
more lopsided splits, such as 7–1. To be clear, a finding that the
Supreme Court usually sides with lopsided lower-court majorities does not necessarily show causal influence. It may simply
show that courts independently tend to converge on legally correct answers in easy cases. Indeed, Lindquist and Klein treated
lower-court support as a proxy for legal soundness, as they
aimed to test the relative importance of legal soundness versus
ideology as competing determinants of Supreme Court decisions.177
174 See, for example, Tom Cummins and Adam Aft, Appellate Review, 2 J Legal Metrics
59, 68–72 (2012); Hansford, Note, 63 Stan L Rev at 1146, 1154–61 (cited in note 64); Stefanie A. Lindquist and David E. Klein, The Influence of Jurisprudential Considerations
on Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict Cases, 40 L & Soc Rev 135, 151–
57 (2006); John S. Summers and Michael J. Newman, Towards a Better Measure and
Understanding of U.S. Supreme Court Review of Courts of Appeals Decisions, 80 USLW
393, 394–96 (2011).
175 See Lindquist and Klein, 40 L & Soc Rev at 144, 148 (cited in note 174).
176 See Tom Cummins and Adam Aft, Appellate Review II: October Term 2011, 3 J
Legal Metrics 37, 38 (2013); Hansford, Note, 63 Stan L Rev at 1165 (cited in note 64);
Summers and Newman, 80 USLW at 395 (cited in note 174). The Supreme Court’s
agreement rate is lower if one considers all cases rather than only those resolving splits;
that is because nonsplit cases are often exercises in error correction. See Summers and
Newman, 80 USLW at 395 (cited in note 174).
177 See Lindquist and Klein, 40 L & Soc Rev at 141–43 (cited in note 174).
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If one wants to get at the role of lower-court decisions as influences, then potentially the most revealing cases are those in
which the Supreme Court rejects a lopsided majority. In such
cases, other factors—perhaps ideology or perhaps the justices’
independent assessment of legal correctness—trump lower-court
consensus. Such rejections of the lower courts do not mean that
the lower courts exerted no influence at all, but if there are
many such rejections, it would at least show that the influence is
not great. Again, somewhat firmer inferences become available
when one supplements this Section’s study of the Court’s voting
behavior with Part III.B’s study of what the Court’s opinions say
about the force of lower-court precedent.
1. Findings from a study of recent terms.
Measuring the Supreme Court’s handling of lopsided splits
requires both a definition of lopsidedness and a method for identifying lopsided splits. Regarding the definition, any particular
cutoff is somewhat arbitrary, but let us define a lopsided division as one in which one side of the dispute has at least four
more circuits (or state high courts) than the other side (for example, a 7–3 split), including cases in which the lower courts are
not divided at all (for example, 4–0 “splits”). Note that this Section uses the lower court as the unit of analysis for measuring
divisions, rather than calculating divisions in terms of how
many judges are on each side, how much of the nation’s population is represented by the relevant courts, or other metrics. The
various rationales for deferring to the lower courts can prioritize
different units of measurement. But the court is the most common
unit and the one that the Supreme Court itself seems to treat as
the most meaningful when it reports lower-court conflicts.
To identify the cases, I began by examining the Supreme
Court’s opinions. That effort included searching concurrences
and dissents for splits that majority opinions did not reveal. By
actually looking at the opinions, one captures some cases that
would be missed if one relied solely on Professor Harold Spaeth’s
Supreme Court Database to identify splits.178 A more difficult
178 See Supreme Court Database: 2013 Release 01 (July 17, 2013), online at
http://supremecourtdatabase.org/data.php?s=2 (visited Aug 12, 2014). The Database,
which is widely used in the empirical literature, codes each case for many variables,
including the reason (if any) that the Court gave for granting certiorari. See Harold
Spaeth, et al, Supreme Court Database Code Book *34, 94 (July 17, 2013), online at
http://supremecourtdatabase.org/_brickFiles/2013_01/SCDB_2013_01_codebook.pdf (visited
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methodological choice is whether one should go outside the four
corners of the decisions (that is, by consulting briefs and lowercourt opinions) in an effort to (1) challenge the Supreme Court’s
characterization of splits, or (2) detect additional splits. The issue
of which materials to consult is an important one, and I discuss
the competing considerations of accuracy and objectivity below.179 For purposes of Table 1, I relied on the decisions themselves to characterize a split; that is, if an opinion presented a
split as 5–1, I did not go behind that characterization in order to
see whether my sense of the “true” circuit count was instead 4–1
or 3–3.180 (In a few cases, the language in the opinion clearly signaled a lopsided split but did not purport to provide a full accounting; Table 1 includes these without listing a specific count.)
Likewise, Table 1 does not include lopsided splits that could be
identified only by considering sources extrinsic to the Court’s
opinions. I did look beyond the four corners of the opinions for
other purposes, as discussed later.
Using the method described above, one can arrange the lopsided splits based on how lopsided the lower courts were and
which way the Supreme Court ruled. In Table 1, the cases are
listed according to the size of the lower-court differential. That
is, +7 means that one side of the split had seven more lower
courts than the other, and the Supreme Court sided with that
lopsided majority; negative numbers mean that the Court sided
with the lower-court minority. The table shows (via bullet
points) which justices sided with the lower-court majority on the
point that is the subject of the split.181 (Recusals are indicated by
a “-”.) The table also indicates the ideological direction of the
Supreme Court’s decision on the relevant issue when there is a

Aug 12, 2014). Relying on the Database’s coding undercounts circuit splits because the
Database does not code a case as resolving a split unless the Supreme Court expressly
describes that as the reason for the grant, even when the Court points out the division of
authority in close proximity to the mention of the grant. Further, I am interested in capturing cases that are not necessarily splits, such as cases in which several lower courts
have all answered the question the same way.
179 See Part III.A.2.
180 If the majority opinion and other opinions explicitly disagreed on the count, I deferred to the majority rather than taking sides. However, I followed a separate opinion’s
characterization if it was not controverted by the majority opinion.
181 I report the voting lineups on the question that is the subject of the lopsided
split. Those lineups do not necessarily coincide with votes on the case disposition; for example, a concurrence in the judgment might actually agree with the dissent on the question that divided the lower courts.
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clear ideological aspect.182 For example, in Lafler v Cooper,183
from October Term 2011, Justice Anthony Kennedy joined the
Court’s liberal camp (Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan) in a liberal decision that agreed with all ten of the lower
courts to have addressed a particular question.184 It is thus
scored +10. An appendix on file with the author and the editors
provides additional details on how the results were derived.

182 Here I employ conventional criteria for ideology; for instance, liberal votes are
those that favor employees, consumers, tort plaintiffs, and criminal defendants over employers, businesses, tort defendants, and prosecutors, respectively. See Lee Epstein and
Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court? Possibly Yes (but
We’re Not Sure Why), 13 U Pa J Const L 263, 272 (2010). Note that the table records the
direction of the decision on the issue that was the topic of the split. Thus, Martel v Clair,
132 S Ct 1276 (2012), is listed as liberal because of the Court’s pro-criminal-defendant
ruling on the legal standard at issue, even though the Court went on to apply that standard to deny habeas relief on the particular facts before it. Id at 1284–89.
183 132 S Ct 1376 (2012).
184 As Lafler illustrates, a given case can present multiple legal questions (or
subquestions), some of which might feature lopsided splits and others not. The Lafler
Court agreed with all of the circuits regarding whether a criminal defendant’s receipt of
poor advice resulting in the rejection of a plea agreement can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel (thus the +10 rating), though the Court vacated the decision below because it disagreed with how the violation at issue had been remedied. See id at 1385,
1391. A similar situation is presented by Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
and School v Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 132 S Ct 694, 701–02, 707
(2012), in which the Supreme Court agreed with the court below (and other circuits) that
there existed a “ministerial exception” to antidiscrimination laws but disagreed with the
court below regarding how to apply the exception to the litigant before it.
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TABLE 1. LOPSIDED CASES AS REVEALED IN THE SUPREME
COURT’S OPINIONS: 2010, 2011, AND 2012 TERMS

SGB

SS

EK

RBG

Ideology
of Ruling

●

●

●

●

lib

●

●

●

●

lib

●

●

●

●

●

cons

●

●

●

●

●

cons

●

●

●

●

lib

●

-

cons

●

cons

SAA

CT

AMK

AS

Case / Conflict
Differential

JGR

Voting with Lower-Court Majority

Supreme Court Agreement with Lopsided Majority,
by Size of Differential
Martel v Clair (OT11)
large

●

●

●

●

●

CSX v McBride (OT10)
large

●

Borough of Duryea v Guarnieri (OT10)
large

●

●

Hosanna-Tabor v EEOC (OT11)
+12 (12–0)

●

●

●

●

Lafler v Cooper (OT11)
+10 (10–0)

●

United States v Tinklenberg (OT10)
+10 (11–1)

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Perry v New Hampshire (OT11)
+8 (11–3)

●

●

Coleman v Court of Appeals of Maryland (OT11)
+7 (7–0)

●

●

cons

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

-

cons

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

-

cons

●

●

●

●

●

-

cons

Harrington v Richter (OT10)
+7 (7–0)

●

●

Abbott v United States (OT10)
+6 (8–2)

●

Sossamon v Texas (OT10)
+5 (6–1)

●

Peugh v United States (OT12)
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+4 (5–1)

●
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●

●

●

●

lib

●

●

●

-

lib

Kasten v Saint-Gobain (OT10)
+4 (6–2)

●

●

●

Supreme Court Disagreement with Lopsided Majority,
by Size of Differential
Bailey v United States (OT12)
large

●

●

lib

●

Taniguchi v Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd (OT11)
-6 (1–7)

●

●

●

cons

●

cons

Cullen v Pinholster (OT10)
-5a

●

Florence v Board of Chosen Freeholders (OT11)
-4 (4–8)

●

●

●

●

cons

-

lib

●

cons

Williamson v Mazda Motor of America, Inc (OT10)
-4 (0–4)
Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co (OT12)
-4 (0–4)

●

●

●

FTC v Actavis, Inc (OT12)
-4b

●

●

●

-

unclear

Mims v Arrow Financial Services (OT11)
-4 (2–6)

unclear

An appendix on file with the author and the editors provides additional details regarding
where in the opinions the splits are revealed as well as other information concerning the
interpretation of the split.
Notes:
a The Supreme Court majority disagreed with both sides of the circuit split, departing from
the views of at least five circuits (and probably more). See Cullen v Pinholster, 131 S Ct
1388, 1417 (2011) (Sotomayor dissenting) (“The majority charts a third, novel course that, so
far as I am aware, no court of appeals has adopted.”).
b The Supreme Court majority charted a middle course that disagreed with both sides of the
circuit split, departing from the views of at least four circuits that had taken more categorical views on either side. See Federal Trade Commission v Actavis, Inc, 133 S Ct 2223, 2230,
2237 (2013).

Using the methods just described, one can see that the
Supreme Court sided with the lower-court majority in 13 out of
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21 lopsided splits (62 percent), including all of the most extremely
lopsided splits. One should be cautious about putting too much
faith in the precision of any figures of this sort, for reasons that I
will expand on shortly, but the results are nonetheless instructive in several ways.
The obvious question is whether lower-court consensus exerts
a constraining effect on the justices’ behavior, leading them to
vote in ways that they otherwise would not. It is hard to speak
with certainty, of course, because Supreme Court decisions likely
reflect a tangled combination of factors, including the formally
authoritative legal materials, ideological preferences, and (maybe)
some degree of deference to lower courts. As for the role of ideology, that factor cannot completely explain the results in Table 1,
as there are a number of cases in which a significant group of
justices side with the lower-court consensus despite the expected
pull of conflicting ideological inclinations. Two such examples
are Tinklenberg and Abbott v United States,185 in which all of the
participating liberal justices voted against the criminal defendant and joined opinions that explicitly invoked the lower-court
consensus.186 Indeed, although detailed analysis of the justices’
reasoning awaits the next Section, it is worth noting that the
large majority of the cases in Table 1 feature one or more opinions expressly claiming support from most lower courts, which
arguably suggests that the lower courts played some role in the
justices’ deliberations. (Or at least that the lower courts played a
role for certain justices; I return to the interesting matter of differences between justices in Part III.B.3.) Still, when the justices
affirm the lower-court consensus, as in those cases in the top
half of Table 1, it is hard to know whether the consensus is having any causal effect or whether the alignment merely reflects
multiple independent recognitions that one answer is clearly
better. Agreement with lopsided majorities is what one would
expect in either scenario.

185

131 S Ct 18 (2010).
Tinklenberg, 131 S Ct at 2014–15 (Breyer) (joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg, Alito,
and Sotomayor); Abbott, 131 S Ct at 23 (Ginsburg) (unanimous). In the majority of the
instances of counterideological voting in Table 1, it is the Court’s liberal members who
vote against type. It is hard to form conclusions at this point, but this seems consistent
with Lindquist and Klein’s study, which found that the liberals on the Court in 1985–95
were more likely to align with lower-court views than were the conservatives. See Lindquist
and Klein, 40 L & Soc Rev at 152 (cited in note 174). More defensible conclusions about
differences between the two camps can be drawn once the voting behavior is supplemented with a consideration of the justices’ statements and other evidence.
186
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Potentially more revealing are the cases in the bottom half
of Table 1. The fact that the Court is willing—not in the majority
of instances, but in an important minority—to buck the lower
courts shows, if evidence were needed, that the lower courts are
not controlling on the justices. Put differently, perhaps the headline is that the Court disagrees with lopsided lower-court majorities so often.187 Indeed, as I explain in the next Section, there is
some reason to worry that the Court’s self-reporting understates
the rate at which it disagrees with lower courts.
Some of the Court’s decisions that depart from the lower
courts likely reflect ideological preferences. Classic left-right
splits are evident, for example, in Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co188 (which concerned the reach of the Alien Tort Statute189) and
Florence v Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington190
(which concerned the constitutionality of strip searches of detainees191). More interestingly, however, other cases rejecting
lopsided lower-court majorities are unanimous or otherwise not
ideologically divided (and there would be more such cases had I
used a more lenient definition of lopsidedness), which arguably
demonstrates that conflicting ideological preferences cannot explain all of the justices’ repudiations of the lower courts. In some
appreciable number of cases, the bulk of the lower courts have
simply gotten it wrong, at least from the Supreme Court’s perspective, and the fact that the lower courts had largely settled
on one view was not enough to persuade the Court to follow them.
It is worth reiterating at this point that the Supreme
Court’s merits docket is just a small window into the law. Most
questions generate consensus or outright unanimity in the lower
courts. If the Court is inclined to agree with the prevailing view,
187 My data are not directly comparable to the 1985–95 data collected by Lindquist
and Klein, because they identified circuit splits through the Database, which finds fewer
cases than my method. See note 178. If I reexamined my data using their method, my
dataset would contain fewer cases, but it would still show the Court agreeing with lopsided lower-court majorities just slightly more than half the time. That rate of agreement is much less than the rate one can derive from their older data, which would show
the Court agreeing with lopsided lower-court majorities about 70 percent of the time. (I
thank Lindquist and Klein for sharing their data, which I used to perform that calculation.) I am reluctant to put too much stock in this comparison across time periods, given
the limitations of the data, which are discussed in the next Section, but the evidence is at
least consistent with a scenario in which the Court today is even less concerned about
the lower courts’ views than it was twenty years ago.
188 133 S Ct 1659 (2013).
189 28 USC § 1350.
190 132 S Ct 1510 (2012).
191 Id at 1513.
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there is little reason to grant review, and therefore such cases
should rarely make their way onto the merits docket—though,
as the top of Table 1 shows, they sometimes actually do.192 If the
Court is inclined to disagree with the prevailing view, it might
still deny review (especially in matters that are regarded as unimportant or that are amenable to correction by others). Sometimes, though, the Court will disagree with the prevailing view
and be moved to grant review, perhaps in order to undo what it
views as the damage being done by so many errant lower courts.
The Court’s desire to correct widespread error probably influences the selection of the few issues that make their way onto
the merits docket out of the many contenders, even if “mere”
error correction in isolated cases does not play much of a role.
So, while the existence of any appreciable number of Supreme
Court decisions rejecting lopsided majorities calls out for explanation, one should not assume that the Supreme Court would
disagree with the lower courts in almost half of all the lopsided
splits that do not make it onto the merits docket.
2. Difficulties in measuring circuit splits—and what those
difficulties reveal.
Table 1 comes with several caveats. Although I began this
project believing that it was more revealing to see what the
Court does with lower-court precedent through its voting behavior than what it says about the value of lower-court precedent in
its opinions, I no longer feel very confident that one can get a
good grasp on what the Court does. The measurement problems
extend to the prior literature on circuit performance as well, and
indeed they will beset just about any attempt to measure the
Court’s behavior in resolving circuit splits.193 Notably, the meth192 The Court’s docket included several cases in which it affirmed positions that the
lower courts had unanimously embraced, which at first glance makes for a surprising
use of the Court’s certiorari discretion. In some of those cases—Martel and Harrington v
Richter, 131 S Ct 770 (2011), come to mind—it seems that the Court probably granted
certiorari in order to correct what it regarded as errant results in particular cases (in
these two examples, from the Ninth Circuit), but along the way it had to address an antecedent question of law that had not proven particularly controversial. Thus, the Court
did not grant certiorari in those cases in order to ratify the prevailing law—as it apparently did in Coleman v Court of Appeals of Maryland, 132 S Ct 1327 (2012)—but rather
the ratification was merely the by-product of trying to reverse a problematic outcome.
193 For an elaboration on these methodological issues, see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl,
Measuring Circuit Splits: A Cautionary Note, 3 J Legal Metrics *2–12 (forthcoming
2014), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2443312 (visited Aug
12, 2014).
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odological difficulties derive in part from the Court’s practices,
practices that show a degree of disregard for the lower courts—a
finding interesting in itself.
To elaborate: it turns out that identifying and counting circuit splits is harder than one might think. One complicating factor—and one that suggests that the Court is not overly concerned with exactly how many courts line up on either side of a
circuit split—is that the Court sometimes does not purport to
list each court of appeals that has weighed in on a question, instead citing an apparent sample of the conflicting decisions194 or
just stating that the lower courts are split without citing any of
them.195
More problematic are situations in which the fact of a split
is not even revealed within any of the Supreme Court’s opinions
in a particular case. Quite a few majority opinions state that the
Court granted certiorari to answer a particular question or simply state that the Court granted certiorari, period.196 In many of
those cases, a significant history of lower-court disagreement
goes unmentioned, as if it had never happened.197 The justices

194 For instance, the Court’s opinion in Henderson v United States, 133 S Ct 1121
(2013), uses “compare, e.g.” and reveals only three circuits as participating in the split, id
at 1125, but the solicitor general’s briefing as respondent at the certiorari stage admitted
a broader circuit split. See Brief for the United States, Henderson v United States, Docket
No 11-9307, *13–15 (US filed May 23, 2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 7069951).
195 See, for example, Smith v United States, 133 S Ct 714, 718 (2013); Rehberg v
Paulk, 132 S Ct 1497, 1501 (2012). Smith is striking because it appears that all or nearly
all of the circuits had previously addressed the question presented, see Brief for the
United States in Opposition, Smith v United States, Docket No 11-8976, *24–26 (US filed
May 14, 2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 3027176), but none of those numerous
decisions is cited by the Supreme Court.
196 See, for example, Greene v Fisher, 132 S Ct 38, 43 (2011).
197 For a notable recent example, see City of Arlington, Texas v Federal Communications Commission, 133 S Ct 1863 (2013), which concerned whether Chevron deference
applies to an agency’s determinations of its own jurisdiction. Id at 1866. That question
had been dividing the lower courts and provoking commentators for years, but Justice
Scalia’s opinion for the Court does not reveal this history. See City of Arlington, Texas v
FCC, 668 F3d 229, 248 & nn 91–93 (5th Cir 2012) (citing conflicting cases stretching
back nearly twenty years). Similarly, the decision in Staub v Proctor Hospital, 131 S Ct
1186 (2011), which concerned the cat’s paw theory of liability for employment discrimination, did not reveal that virtually every circuit had weighed in on how to apply that
theory under several antidiscrimination statutes, that various tests had developed, and
so forth. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Staub v Proctor Hospital,
Docket No 09-400, *9 (US filed Mar 16, 2010) (available on Westlaw at 2010 WL
3611711) (“Staub Amicus Brief”) (mentioning conflicting decisions from twelve circuits).
Professor Wayne Logan, in a valuable study of Fourth Amendment circuit splits, similarly
observed that the Supreme Court’s merits decisions often fail to mention the existence of
long-standing divisions of authority, much less meaningfully engage with the competing
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differ in their habits in this regard. Justice Scalia has been especially likely not to mention the existence of a split even when
one exists.198 This is perhaps not surprising, given his principled
opposition to giving weight to the views of the lower courts.199
But one can hold that methodological position and still make it a
practice to state that the Court is resolving a question that has
divided the lower courts—and, better still, cite at least some of
the conflicting decisions. Doing so should hasten the legal system’s realization (through citation services and otherwise) that
some cases are no longer good law.
To return to Table 1: because its calculations reflect the
state of the world as reported in the Supreme Court’s opinions,
some lopsided splits could be missed. And, indeed, my own investigations beyond the four corners of the opinions show that
quite a few splits, including at least a few lopsided splits, are not
revealed within the opinions. Mere undercounting of splits is not
necessarily problematic, but the greater worry is that the data
could be biased in systematic ways. One obvious possibility is
that opinions tend to mention strong support from lower courts
when doing so bolsters the opinion but obscure lower-court views
when they are unsupportive. Some tentative support for that
suspicion comes from the fact that several cases in the bottom
half of Table 1 appear there only because the Supreme Court
majority’s departure from the prevailing view in the lower courts
is revealed in a dissent. In Bailey v United States,200 the majority
opinion states that the lower courts were divided but does not
list them;201 not until reading the dissent does one learn that the
bulk of the circuits had adopted a view contrary to that of the

views. See Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the
Fourth Amendment, 65 Vand L Rev 1137, 1167–69 (2012).
198 Both City of Arlington and Staub, discussed in the previous footnote, are Scalia
opinions. My observations about Scalia’s tendencies accord with those of Professor Arthur
Hellman, who reported on this feature of Scalia’s opinions some time ago. See Arthur D.
Hellman, Never the Same River Twice: The Empirics and Epistemology of Intercircuit
Conflicts, 63 U Pitt L Rev 81, 149 (2001). Note that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Kennedy also tended to have few opinions revealing circuit splits in the years that I
studied, though it may be that their respective roles as chief justice and frequently decisive swing justice garner them a disproportionate share of the assignments in highprofile constitutional cases in which splits are less important (versus technical statutory
questions that divide lower courts).
199 See Part III.B.3.
200 133 S Ct 1031 (2013).
201 See id at 1037.
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Bailey majority.202 There are other similar instances in which a
majority opinion does not mention that it is rejecting the bulk of
lower-court authority or describes the split in such a way as to
obscure the extent of the Court’s break with the lower courts.203
Perhaps dissents are common when the majority departs from
prevailing views, but one naturally wonders what happens when
there is no dissent to flag the issue.
These suspicions led me to investigate further, and I found
lopsided splits that were not hinted at in the Supreme Court’s
opinions at all. For example, in Thompson v North American
Stainless, LP,204 the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit
but did not mention that the Sixth Circuit’s view was, apparently,
in accord with the unanimous position of the handful of other
published circuit court decisions addressing the matter—
information that comes to light only by reading the decisions
below and the briefing.205 That is worrying because it feeds the
suspicion that the lower courts are invoked or ignored in a strategic way. And yet, as a counterexample, there is Staub v Proctor
Hospital,206 in which Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court
probably could have claimed to side with the large majority of
the lower courts but did not even mention the split.207
202 See id at 1048 (Breyer dissenting) (“[A]lmost every Court of Appeals to have considered the matter has taken the Second Circuit’s approach.”). See also Brief for the
United States, Bailey v United States, Docket No 11-770, *22–23 (US filed Sept 20, 2012)
(available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 4259480) (claiming uniform support from the courts of
appeals).
203 Compare Kiobel, 133 S Ct at 1663 (omitting prior precedent on the question presented), with id at 1675 (Breyer concurring in the judgment) (citing several cases from
the courts of appeals). See also text accompanying notes 11–12 (discussing Taniguchi).
204 131 S Ct 863 (2011).
205 Compare id at 867 (stating that the Court granted certiorari to review the Sixth
Circuit’s decision, but not mentioning other circuits), with Thompson v North American
Stainless, LP, 567 F3d 804, 811 (6th Cir 2009) (stating that the Sixth Circuit agreed with
three other circuits and that “no circuit court of appeals” had held to the contrary); Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Thompson v North American Stainless, LP,
Docket No 09-291, *6–7 (US filed May 25, 2010) (available on Westlaw at 2010 WL
2101919) (“Thompson Amicus Brief”) (“Four courts of appeals have considered thirdparty retaliation claims asserted by employees in the position of petitioner under Title
VII or statutes with substantially identical anti-retaliation provisions, and all four have
rejected them.”). I emphasize that judgments about the circuits’ positions are debatable.
As the solicitor general noted, some of the decisions according with the Sixth Circuit’s
used different rationales or involved parallel language in different discrimination statutes. See Thompson Amicus Brief at *7.
206 131 S Ct 1186 (2011).
207 The Seventh Circuit, which was reversed in Staub, had taken a strict approach
that only one other circuit embraced. See Staub Amicus Brief at *8–9. The other circuits
were more lenient, though they used varying language, which makes it hard to give an
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As the above discussion shows, my own investigations have
often taken me beyond the four corners of Supreme Court opinions. So why not eschew reliance on what the Court says about
splits and instead report what is really going on? Unfortunately,
that effort would not get at the whole truth either. Going outside
of the Court’s opinions in order to determine the actual circuit
breakdowns in a purported split introduces much more complexity and subjectivity regarding whether decisions conflict: Are
certain cases really in conflict or are they distinguishable? Are
the allegedly conflicting rules dicta or holdings? Would the lower
courts involved in a split still reach the same decisions today
given intervening Supreme Court rulings? What about intracircuit conflicts and the like? Indeed, the justices themselves sometimes disagree about the true circuit breakdown.208 Further,
there is no clear stopping point once one departs from the four
corners of the Court’s opinions. One cannot be certain that the
certiorari filings are comprehensive and trustworthy. (Those
petitioning for certiorari may exaggerate conflicts, while respondents may deny or minimize them.) Lower-court opinions often
collect cases on either side of a split, but there is no guarantee
that those counts are accurate and complete either. One would
have to research all of the legal questions independently, which
is time-consuming and is by no means guaranteed to yield an objective answer.
Because of these difficulties, one should not put too much
faith in any purportedly precise measures of the Supreme
Court’s resolutions of circuit splits. There are at least a few lopsided cases that the Court’s opinions do not reveal, though one
should not expect very many to go unmentioned given that an
opinion (whether for the majority or a separate opinion) that
aligns with a lopsided lower-court majority can bolster its argument by saying so. I believe that the 62 percent figure reported
above as the rate at which the Court agrees with lopsided lowerexact circuit lineup. See id (discussing the law in various circuits). Further, because the
Supreme Court’s opinion did not address those other circuits, it is hard to say definitively
what the Court meant to endorse (beyond the fact that it clearly did not endorse the
strict view).
208 See generally, for example, Milner v Department of the Navy, 131 S Ct 1259
(2011). The majority insisted that the case involved a roughly even division in the lower
courts, while the dissent accused the majority of joining the wrong side of a lopsided
split. Compare id at 1268–69 (majority), with id at 1274 (Breyer dissenting). I have deferred to the majority, so Milner is not in Table 1. If the majority had ignored the lowercourt precedent or failed to dispute the dissent’s characterization, I probably would have
included it in the table, as with the cases discussed in the text accompanying notes 202–03.
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court majorities more likely overestimates the Court’s agreement
with the lower courts than underestimates it. That is because it is
plausible to suspect that an authoring justice is more likely to
mention and accentuate the extent of agreement with the lower
courts than the opposite. For the same reason, there is some basis
to worry that the rates of agreement between the Supreme
Court and lower courts reported by other studies209 are also too
high (and they are certainly inexact).210
B.

Invocations of the Lower Courts in the Justices’ Reasoning

A more complete and confident understanding of the issue
requires that we also look at what the justices say in their opinions. Do they state that they are influenced by lower-court
precedent? If so, which of the rationales explored in Part II—
stability, epistemic authority, pragmatism, and so on—do the
justices find compelling? And which justices?
In order to answer those questions, I attempted to identify
and categorize every instance, over the last three Supreme
Court terms, in which an opinion invoked or relied on the views
of the lower courts as support for its position on the question
presented. That does not include every instance in which a lower
court is cited on any point of law. For example, a Supreme Court
opinion will sometimes cite lower-court precedent on a point that
is being assumed for purposes of argument or on a point that is
tangential to the question actually before the Court.211 Such references do show some appreciation for the views of the lower
courts, but it is hard to evaluate their significance. For one
thing, it is sometimes unclear whether an opinion is actually
taking a position on some tangential point or merely accepting it
arguendo. Moreover, any given question presented involves
countless tangentially related questions on which there might
(or might not) be a majority view that the Supreme Court might
(or might not) decide to mention. Thus, if one finds, say, ten
mentions of consensus on tangential points, that could be ten
209

See note 174.
For more thoughts on these issues, see generally Bruhl, 3 J Legal Metrics (cited
in note 193).
211 See, for example, Gonzalez v Thaler, 132 S Ct 641, 649 n 5 (2012) (citing a lower
court for the proposition that “[t]he courts of appeals uniformly interpret ‘circuit justice
or judge’ to encompass district judges,” a question at most tangentially related to the
question presented); Douglas v Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc,
132 S Ct 1204, 1211–12 (2012) (Roberts dissenting); Pepper v United States, 131 S Ct
1229, 1248 n 16 (2011).
210
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mentions out of twenty opportunities to observe a consensus, or
it could be ten out of one hundred opportunities. To avoid these
and related difficulties, I report only the justices’ observations
about what the lower courts have done with the actual question
presented. I do, however, include the justices’ observations about
lower-court views on what might be called “subquestions” within
the question presented and on questions that are phrased at a
somewhat higher level of generality than the question presented.212
Naturally this requires some judgment calls, so the counts cannot pretend to absolute precision.
Table 2 summarizes the results, divided into the particular
rationales for deference involved, along with a category for brief,
unelaborated invocations of the lower courts and a category for
comments rejecting reliance on lower courts as a methodological
matter.

212 See, for example, Global-Tech Appliances, Inc v SEB SA, 131 S Ct 2060, 2070 &
n 9 (2011) (defining the “willful blindness” standard in a patent case by referring to lowercourt cases articulating the standard in other contexts).
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TABLE 2. INVOCATIONS OF LOWER-COURT SUPPORT, GROUPED BY
RATIONALE AND JUSTICE: 2010, 2011, AND 2012 TERMS
Case

Location of Invocation

Significant Reliance on Lower Courts without
Emphasizing Particular Grounds
Janus Capital v First De131 S Ct 2296, 2311–12
rivatives Traders
(2011)
J. McIntyre Machinery v
Nicastro

Authoring Justice

Breyer dissenting

131 S Ct 2780, 2801–02,
2804–06 (2011)

Ginsburg dissenting

131 S Ct 2007, 2014
(2011)

Breyer

131 S Ct 2343, 2349
(2011)

Scalia

133 S Ct 2586, 2602
(2013)

Alito

**Vance v Ball State
University

133 S Ct 2434, 2453
(2013)

Alito

Johnson v Williams

133 S Ct 1088, 1097
(2013)

Alito

**Bullock v
BankChampaign, NA

133 S Ct 1754, 1761
(2013)

Breyer

*Kiobel v Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co

133 S Ct 1659, 1675–77
(2013)

Breyer concurring

**Henderson v United
States

133 S Ct 1121, 1130
(2013)

Breyer

Bailey v United States

133 S Ct 1031, 1048
(2013)

Breyer dissenting

Florence v Board of
Chosen Freeholders

132 S Ct 1510, 1530
(2012)

Breyer dissenting

*United States v
Tinklenberg

131 S Ct 2007, 2014–15
(2011)

Breyer

*Milner v Department of
the Navy

131 S Ct 1259, 1276
(2011)

Breyer dissenting

Epistemic
*United States v
Tinklenberg
Nevada Commission on
Ethics v Carrigan
Modest Pragmatic
**Koontz v St. Johns River
Water Management
District
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Los Angeles County v
Humphries

131 S Ct 447, 453 (2010)

Breyer

**Kirtsaeng v John Wiley
& Sons, Inc

133 S Ct 1351, 1389–90
(2013)

Ginsburg dissenting

*Taniguchi v Kan Pacific
Saipan, Ltd

132 S Ct 1997, 2010–11
(2012)

Ginsburg dissenting

**Mims v Arrow Financial
Services, LLC

132 S Ct 740, 753 (2012)

Ginsburg

*CSX Transportation, Inc
v McBride

131 S Ct 2630, 2641,
2643–44 (2011)

Ginsburg

**Skinner v Switzer

131 S Ct 1289, 1299
(2011)

Ginsburg

Martel v Clair

132 S Ct 1276, 1285, 1288
(2012)

Kagan

Lafler v Cooper

132 S Ct 1376, 1385,
1389–90 (2012)

Kennedy

Hosanna-Tabor v EEOC

132 S Ct 694, 705, 707,
710 (2012)

Roberts

Perry v New Hampshire

132 S Ct 716, 737–38
(2012)

Sotomayor dissenting

Freeman v United States

131 S Ct 2685, 2698 n 3,
2700 n 9 (2011)

Sotomayor concurring

**Schindler Elevator Corp
v United States

131 S Ct 1885, 1894–95
(2011)

Thomas

Acquiescence
*Kiobel v Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co

133 S Ct 1659, 1675–77
(2013)

Breyer concurring

*Milner v Department of
the Navy

131 S Ct 1259, 1274–75
(2011)

Breyer dissenting

*Taniguchi v Kan Pacific
Saipan, Ltd

132 S Ct 1997, 2008–09
(2012)

Ginsburg dissenting

*CSX Transportation, Inc
v McBride

131 S Ct 2630, 2641
(2011)

Ginsburg

Microsoft Corp v
i4i Limited Partnership

131 S Ct 2238, 2252
(2011)

Sotomayora
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131 S Ct 2007, 2014–15
(2011)

Breyer

*Milner v Department of
the Navy

131 S Ct 1259, 1276–78
(2011)

Breyer dissenting

Maracich v Spears

133 S Ct 2191, 2222
(2013)

Ginsburg dissenting

*Taniguchi v Kan Pacific
Saipan

132 S Ct 1997, 2008–09
(2012)

Ginsburg dissenting

*CSX Transportation, Inc
v McBride

131 S Ct 2630, 2640–41
(2011)

Ginsburg

Lozman v City of Riviera
Beach, Florida

133 S Ct 735, 753–55
(2013)

Sotomayor dissenting

Southern Union Co v
United States

132 S Ct 2344, 2357
(2012)

Sotomayor

Opinion Claims Support from a Majority of Lower Courts
without Elaborationb
Hosanna-Tabor v EEOC
132 S Ct 694, 714 (2012)
Alito concurring
Global-Tech Appliances,
Inc v SEB SA

131 S Ct 2060, 2069–70
(2011)

Alito

Lozman v City of Riviera
Beach, Florida

133 S Ct 735, 743 (2013)

Breyer

Fowler v United States

131 S Ct 2045, 2050
(2011)

Breyerc

Abbott v United States

131 S Ct 18, 23 (2010)

Ginsburg

Arizona Christian School
v Winn

131 S Ct 1436, 1453
(2011)

Kagan dissenting

United States v Home
Concrete

132 S Ct 1836, 1852
(2012)

Kennedy dissentingd

Florence v Board of
Chosen Freeholders

132 S Ct 1510, 1518
(2012)

Kennedye

Coleman v Court of
Appeals of Maryland

132 S Ct 1327, 1332
(2012)

Kennedy

Borough of Duryea v
Guarnieri

131 S Ct. 2488, 2491–93,
2495 (2011)

Kennedy

Harrington v Richter

131 S Ct 770, 784 (2011)

Kennedy
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Arizona Free Enterprise
Club v Bennett

131 S Ct 2806, 2823
(2011)

Roberts

Ransom v FIA Card
Services, NA

131 S Ct 716, 730 (2011)

Scalia dissenting

Cullen v Pinholster

131 S Ct 1388, 1417
(2011)

Sotomayor dissenting

Sossamon v Texas

131 S Ct 1651, 1662 n 9
(2011)

Thomas

Negative Comments about Relying on Lower Courts
Milner v Department of
131 S Ct 1259, 1268
the Navy
(2011)

Kagan

Global-Tech Appliances,
Inc v SEB SA

131 S Ct 2060, 2073
(2011)

Kennedy dissenting

CSX Transportation, Inc v
McBride

131 S Ct 2630, 2650
(2011)

Roberts dissenting

United States v
Tinklenberg

131 S Ct 2007, 2018
(2011)

Scalia concurring

* Opinion cites multiple rationales.
** Opinion invokes the pragmatic rationale but does not clearly claim a majority of
lower courts in support. The logic of the pragmatic rationale can apply even in the
absence of majority support. See Part III.B.2.
Notes:
a In this case, the Court inferred congressional acquiescence in a long-standing interpretation of the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction in the field.
b Several of the cases listed in the preceding categories also contain a separate passing reference to lower-court support, but I have not included them again in this category. This category is for cases that contain only a brief invocation of lower-court
precedent without mentioning particular grounds for attending to lower-court views.
c Breyer’s opinion for the Court contended that “[n]o [c]ircuit” had adopted the position of Scalia’s concurrence, but it was not clear whether most circuits agreed with
the Court’s own position. See Fowler v United States, 131 S Ct 2045, 2050 (2011).
d The opinion claimed support from “several” decisions in the courts of appeals but
did not explicitly call them a majority, so it is debatable whether to include this case.
United States v Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S Ct 1836, 1852 (2012). It appears, based on other sources, that the “several” cases did in fact constitute a majority,
though it was a fairly narrow one. See Brief for the Respondent, Beard v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Docket No 10-1553, *19–20 (US filed July 27, 2011)
(available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 3202962).
e Kennedy did not claim support from a majority of all of the courts of appeals but
claimed support from all of those to have ruled on the issue in the decade leading up
to the Court’s decision. See Florence, 132 S Ct at 1518.

The results can be analyzed along several dimensions: how
often the Supreme Court invoked the lower courts, which rationales the Court most commonly employed, and which justices
were most likely to rely on lower-court support.
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1. Overall frequency of use.
Invocations of support from the lower courts are not unusual,
but neither are they routine. Looking at the Court’s entire output over the last three terms, one finds invocations of the lower
courts in about forty cases, or around one-sixth of the merits
decisions. For comparison, that is more often than the Supreme
Court cited The Federalist (seventeen citing cases) or Blackstone’s
Commentaries (eighteen citing cases) during the same period.213
Of course, comparing citation rates has limited value, because
different types of sources are potentially relevant in different
cases. The Federalist is not a plausible source for most ERISA
cases, and the weight of lower-court opinion is not available
when there is no clear majority view.
Not all invocations of the lower courts are equal. In around
one-third of the cases invoking lower-court support, the discussion is brief and unelaborated; at the minimal end, it may
amount to nothing more than a passing mention of agreement
with the majority of the lower courts.214 Such mentions show
that the Court is part of a larger judicial enterprise, but they do
not necessarily reflect that the opinion even purports to give
lower-court views any weight as authority. In the remaining
two-thirds of the invocations of the lower courts, the views of the
lower courts are presented as having more value: the opinion either mentions lower-court views repeatedly with a suggestion
that some weight is given, or the invocation of the lower courts
is tied to some particular reason to care about what the lower
courts think.
It is striking how many of the invocations of lower-court majorities appear in dissents. This provides more evidence that the
lower courts have at best modest influence on the Supreme
Court. Many of these dissents were authored by the Court’s liberals, which suggests a connection to interpretive methodology
and ideology more broadly, a topic discussed again shortly.215

213 This statement is based on a search of the Westlaw Supreme Court database for
“Federalist” and “Blackstone” for the period October 2010 through June 2013. Some false
positives were excluded (such as references to “federalist principles” or business entities
with “Blackstone” in the name).
214 See, for example, Coleman, 132 S Ct at 1332 (“In agreement with every Court of
Appeals to have addressed this question, this Court now holds . . .”).
215 See Part III.B.3.
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2. Different rationales for relying on the lower courts.
By far the most common basis for invoking the lower
courts—among the cases with more than passing references—
was the pragmatic rationale. That argument posits that, once
the lower courts have created a certain state of the law, the
Supreme Court can observe the consequences that flow from it;
if no terrible consequences appear, the Court has reason to prefer
that state of affairs to a less tested alternative.216 Justice Breyer’s
fondness for this sort of reasoning is not surprising given his
embrace of evaluating practical consequences as one aspect of
sound judicial decisionmaking.217 But, as these results show,
other members of the current Court, even more formalist justices,
also incorporate consequences into their reasoning.218
Before getting carried away with the surprising prevalence
of pragmatism, one should remember that one characteristic of
the pragmatic rationale uniquely inflates its incidence in the
Court’s opinions. In particular, the logic of modest pragmatism,
unlike that of other rationales, makes sense whether or not one’s
favored position has been adopted by most of the courts to have
addressed the matter. As long as some critical mass of courts
has adopted a particular view for a while, one can plausibly advance the argument that any seriously negative consequences
inherent in that view would have manifested themselves. Table
2 uses two asterisks to indicate cases in which an opinion invokes
the pragmatic argument without claiming that the opinion’s
preferred interpretation of the law represents a clear majority
position. In some cases, it is a narrow majority view, though in a
few it is actually a minority view. Still, the pragmatic rationale
remains the most popular even without those cases.
Another feature that may help to explain pragmatism’s
relative prevalence is that it can serve as a rebuttal to a consequentialist argument from the briefs or an opposing opinion.
That is, if one opinion says that a certain interpretation will
216

See Part II.B.
See Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge’s View 82 (Knopf
2010) (describing his approach as “pragmatic—as that concept is broadly used to encompass efforts that consider and evaluate consequences”).
218 See Miranda McGowan, Do as I Do, Not as I Say: An Empirical Investigation of
Justice Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory Interpretation, 78 Miss L J 129,
173–80, 188–89 (2008) (showing that Scalia frequently relies on consequentialist arguments and his sense of statutory purposes); Jane S. Schacter, Text or Consequences?, 76
Brooklyn L Rev 1007, 1009, 1012–15 (2011) (explaining that consequentialist arguments
are common even among textualists).
217
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have bad consequences, that charge can be rebutted by showing
that the interpretation has already been tried out and has, in
fact, not been so bad after all.219 Thus, an opinion’s author might
use the pragmatic argument defensively in response to actual or
anticipated counterarguments.
Although the stability/reliance argument for following the
lower courts figures prominently in the scholarly commentary,220
it appears only rarely in the cases that I examined. Perhaps that
is because, as proposed above, the argument is most forceful in
cases that do not regularly appear on the Supreme Court’s docket
(for example, when there is a long-standing consensus on a
question that engenders serious reliance interests).221
The last three years also saw few opinions citing the acquiescence rationale, which is the notion that one can infer congressional approval from the failure to legislatively override longstanding and unequivocal lower-court precedent. Acquiescence
arguments used to be more common, and their decline can be
traced to two factors. The first is the appointment of Justice
Scalia to the Supreme Court.222 His brand of textualism makes
him a committed opponent of arguments that draw inferences
from congressional silence.223 His views have perhaps proved
persuasive to some of his colleagues and, in any event, his willingness to write a separate opinion objecting to such arguments224 may dissuade hassle-averse opinion writers from including them even when the writer finds them compelling.225
Second, and more recently, the departure of Justice Stevens
219 See, for example, Vance v Ball State University, 133 S Ct 2434, 2452–54 (2013).
See also David S. Law and David Zaring, Law versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and
the Use of Legislative History, 51 Wm & Mary L Rev 1653, 1736–38 (2010) (finding that
citation to legislative history in a Supreme Court opinion is correlated with the presence of
citations to legislative history in another opinion in the same case—a “tit-for-tat” effect).
220 See text accompanying notes 112–14.
221 See Part II.D.
222 Writing twenty-five years ago, Eskridge noted that then-recently appointed Justice
Scalia’s criticisms of inaction arguments had already significantly raised the temperature of the debate over using acquiescence and related arguments. See Eskridge, 87 Mich
L Rev at 67–68, 92 & n 152 (cited in note 99).
223 For one of his particularly vehement early statements against imputing acquiescence, see Johnson v Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 480 US
616, 671–72 (1987) (Scalia dissenting).
224 See, for example, Jerman v Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S
Ct 1605, 1625–26 (2010) (Scalia concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
225 A similar dynamic may be at work in the Court’s use of legislative history, another Scalia-disfavored interpretive resource. See James J. Brudney and Corey Ditslear,
Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L 117, 160–71 (2008).
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means that the Court has lost one of its chief supporters of
acquiescence arguments.226
3. Differences among the justices and the role of
interpretive methodology.
The justices’ propensity to rely on the lower courts tends,
roughly, to track their overall political ideologies. Although neither side of the Court is monolithic, the more conservative justices mostly do not invoke lower-court consensus for support,
while the more liberal justices tend to cite it more frequently.
Moreover, there is some evidence that the liberals’ statements
are not just cheap talk. Referring back to Table 1, recall that
there were instances in which a significant number of justices
sided with the lower-court consensus despite ideological inclinations that would be expected to pull them in the other direction.
In the majority of those instances it was the Court’s liberal
members who voted against type, which is consistent with some
prior research.227
If there is in fact a tendency for the liberals to be influenced
by lower-court precedent more than the conservatives—and I
emphasize again the measurement difficulties that plague the
study of circuit splits—what would explain that difference?
There are a number of possibilities, some of which involve individual idiosyncrasies or historical contingencies,228 but one can
construct a plausible explanation that links the difference to the
underlying interpretive commitments of the two groups. The
Court’s conservatives tend to be originalist in constitutional cases,
but lower courts mostly parse the Court’s holdings and dicta;
moreover, when the lower courts do undertake originalist research, it is unlikely to be very persuasive.229 To the extent that
some prevailing constitutional doctrine is still the product of
prior, more liberal eras of jurisprudence (like the Warren Court),
the conservatives would also be more willing to overrule precedent,
226 For prominent examples of Stevens’s invocation of acquiescence, see Morrison v
National Australia Bank Ltd, 130 S Ct 2869, 2890–91 (2010) (Stevens concurring in the
judgment); Central Bank of Denver, NA v First Interstate Bank of Denver, NA, 511 US
164, 196–98 (1994) (Stevens dissenting).
227 See note 186 and accompanying text.
228 For instance, it may be that the length of one’s prior service on a lower court increases one’s receptivity to following the lower courts. That explanation has some appeal,
though it cannot explain all of the data points (Kennedy, for example, served for more
than a decade on the Ninth Circuit).
229 See text accompanying notes 146–50.
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further distancing them from lower courts, which lack that option. In statutory interpretation, the conservatives are more
likely to believe in the primacy, even the exclusivity, of the enacted text. And although one might suppose that the lower
courts could serve as reliable interpreters of the ordinary meaning
of language, such that they would usually reach the correct interpretation, the brand of textualism actually practiced by those
like Justice Scalia is extremely complex: it eventually finds
“clear” meanings, but the route to clarity involves complicated
“whole code” reasoning that may be anything but obvious.230 The
Court’s more liberal members, by contrast, are more open to
ambiguity and evolving meanings, and they tend to be methodologically eclectic. Just as they are willing to depart from the
most linguistically obvious reading of text in the name of purpose
or intent or policy, they can also find a place in their methodology
to let semantics yield to lower-court consensus, which reflects
settled practices (stability) and passes the test of workability
(modest pragmatism).
It is interesting to juxtapose the conservatives’ relative indifference to lower-court precedent with the professed textualist
aim of reading texts (particularly statutes) so as to make the law
as coherent and consistent as possible.231 The conservatives evidently believe that the goal of coherence is better achieved not
through consistency with lower-court decisions, but by drawing
on broader, background principles of law, often those rooted in
the common law. That is, they appear to prioritize what Professor
Anita Krishnakumar has called “landscape coherence,” even
when doing so may be suboptimal for the particular question at
hand.232 A nice illustration comes from CSX Transportation, Inc
v McBride,233 which concerned the standard of causation under
the Federal Employers’ Liability Act234 (FELA). The majority
opinion by Justice Ginsburg relied heavily on the fact that the
230 Bruhl, 97 Cornell L Rev at 442–43, 477–78 (cited in note 45) (explaining that, for
Scalia, the linguistic frame of reference is the entire US Code, not just the particular act
at issue).
231 See Green v Bock Laundry Machine Co, 490 US 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia concurring
in the judgment) (stating that statutory terms should be read so as to be “most compatible
with the surrounding body of law”). See also Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:
Federal Courts and the Law 17 (Princeton 1997) (referring to integrating a statute with
“the remainder of the corpus juris”).
232 Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era:
An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 Hastings L J 221, 221, 225–26 (2010).
233 131 S Ct 2630 (2011).
234 45 USC § 51 et seq.
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vast majority of lower courts had understood the standard in a
particular way for decades.235 The dissent, authored by Chief
Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Alito, Scalia, and Kennedy,
relied from beginning to end on a different source of wisdom:
“accumulated common law history” in the form of the “enduring
common law concept” of proximate cause.236 One would suppose
that the lower-court cases concerning FELA causation would
have considered that common law background too, along with
more statute-specific factors, and yet the dissent largely bypassed those on-point decisions in order to appeal to broader
principles that pervade the general law of torts.237 In this sort of
case, the conservatives’ preference for continuity with the common law and general background principles is hard to defend
from the point of view of the deeper rule-of-law values like predictability that one would expect them to invoke.
The correspondence between ideology and attitudes toward
lower-court precedent is certainly not perfect. Although it is too
early to form firm conclusions about her methodological commitments, Justice Kagan seems less interested in relying on the lower
courts than her colleagues on the Court’s liberal wing or her predecessor, Justice Stevens.238 Her opinions dutifully note circuit splits
(and, as the most junior justice, she probably receives more than
her fair share of complicated-but-dry statutory cases), but so far
she rarely purports to give weight to lower-court views or explain
why their views might be worthy of deference.239 Further, she
joined the conservatives in the text-trumps-long-standing-practice

235

See McBride, 131 S Ct at 2634, 2640–41.
Id at 2644–45, 2652 (Roberts dissenting). Justice Thomas joined the majority
opinion in part.
237 Staub presents another example of using lower courts to provide background
guidance rather than specific guidance. Scalia’s opinion for the Court cited several lowercourt cases from unrelated contexts in order to divine general principles of agency law.
See Staub, 131 S Ct at 1191–92. The opinion did not cite the many lower-court cases that
had addressed the particular Title VII issue before the Court. See note 197.
238 We have only a few years in which to observe, and the sample size for Kagan is
further reduced because she recused herself from about one-third of the cases in her first
term, October Term 2010. Stephen Wermiel, Justice Kagan’s Recusals, SCOTUSblog
(Oct 9, 2012), online at http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/scotus-for-law-students
-sponsored-by-bloomberg-law-justice-kagans-recusals (visited Aug 12, 2014).
239 Apart from the two cases noted in Table 2, there are a few instances in which
Kagan (like her colleagues) cites lower courts as authorities on points tangential to the
question presented. See, for example, US Airways, Inc v McCutchen, 133 S Ct 1537, 1550
n 8 (2013) (Kagan). See also National Meat Association v Harris, 132 S Ct 965, 974
(2012) (Kagan) (citing and distinguishing lower-court cases).
236
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opinion in Taniguchi.240 And although Milner v Department of the
Navy241 was decided by a vote of 8–1, with only Justice Breyer
championing the DC Circuit’s long-standing-but-textuallytenuous interpretation of the Freedom of Information Act,242
Kagan’s majority opinion not only disputed Breyer’s contention
that the DC Circuit’s view had commanded widespread approval
in many lower courts but, before doing that, claimed that Breyer’s
position “would be immaterial even if true, because we have no
warrant to ignore clear statutory language on the ground that
other courts have done so.”243 In some sense she is of course correct, but the statement does present things in quite a stark,
black-and-white way.
Among the more conservative justices, Scalia appears particularly opposed to crediting the views of the lower courts.
When he does mention lower-court precedent, it is often to explicitly reject the soundness of following it.244 As noted above, his
opinions often do not even reveal that there is a split, which is
unhelpful. To his credit, he does not appear to be opportunistic
about mentioning lower courts: I found several instances in
which he neglects to mention lower-court views even when he is
apparently following a lower-court majority.245
Scalia did rely on lower courts in a significant, albeit unusual,
way in Nevada Commission on Ethics v Carrigan.246 The Nevada
Supreme Court had invalidated on First Amendment grounds a
state law requiring state legislators to recuse themselves from
votes in which they had a conflict of interest.247 The US Supreme
Court reversed.248 Scalia’s opinion for the Court observed that
“[t]he Nevada Supreme Court and [the respondent] have not cited
a single decision invalidating a generally applicable conflict-ofinterest recusal rule—and such rules have been commonplace

240

See Taniguchi, 132 S Ct at 1999. See also text accompanying notes 153–59.
131 S Ct 1259 (2011).
242 5 USC § 552.
243 Milner, 131 S Ct at 1268 (emphasis added).
244 For notable examples from before the period covered by this study, see Morrison,
130 S Ct at 2878–81; Brogan v United States, 522 US 398, 407–08 (1998).
245 See generally, for example, Smith, 544 US 228; City of Arlington, 133 S Ct 1863;
Staub, 131 S Ct 1186. In each of these instances, I am following the solicitor general’s
characterization of the split. In Staub, the circuit split was arguably not even close, such
that it would have been tempting to mention that fact. See note 207.
246 131 S Ct 2343 (2011).
247 Id at 2346.
248 Id at 2352.
241
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for over 200 years.”249 Relying on old state court cases, old statutes, and other materials, Scalia’s opinion revealed a tradition of
regulating legislators, a tradition sufficient to approve the challenged law’s constitutionality.250 In fact, Scalia found the old
cases and sources more persuasive as authorities than some
more recent decisions “from the 1980’s and afterwards” that the
respondent relied on.251 This perhaps makes sense for a constitutional originalist: old decisions have greater epistemic value because they were closer to the relevant original understandings.
One can contrast Justice Scalia’s fairly dependable disregard of the lower courts with the less consistent stance taken by
some other members of the Court. For example, Justice Kennedy
has quite often mentioned, in passing, that his view accords with
the majority (or all) of the lower courts.252 But the lower-court
decisions do not appear to be doing much work in his reasoning,
for he does not linger to explain the significance of such agreement
(stability, congressional acquiescence, deference to expertise,
and so forth), and he has authored or joined opinions that explicitly
reject reliance on lower-court consensus as an interpretive
method.253
CONCLUSION: PRECEDENT, EQUILIBRIUM, AND DIRECTIONS FOR
FURTHER RESEARCH
This Article has considered how lower-court precedent does
and should figure into the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking. Yet
the cases that make their way onto the Supreme Court’s merits
docket represent just a small fraction of the judiciary’s business.
This Article concludes by considering the role of lower-court
precedent from a more systemic perspective. Doing so generates
some interesting implications and points the way toward some
fruitful topics for further investigation.
To begin with, the use of lower-court precedent provides an
example of how judicial decisionmaking differs substantially
across courts. Lower-court precedent enjoys at most modest influence on the Supreme Court, but it looms large within the lower

249

Id at 2348.
See Nevada Commission on Ethics, 131 S Ct at 2347–49.
251 Id at 2349.
252 See Table 2.
253 See, for example, Global-Tech Appliances, 131 S Ct at 2073 (Kennedy dissenting)
(“[C]ounting courts in a circuit split is not this Court’s usual method for deciding important questions of law.”).
250
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courts themselves. The federal courts of appeals are not formally
bound by out-of-circuit precedents, yet they give them serious
consideration and some degree of authority. Lower courts frequently make statements to the effect that they are reluctant to
create or exacerbate a split of authority absent good reason.254
Probably the main justification for the circuits to give weight to
one another’s precedents is the promotion of geographic uniformity.255 Nationally uniform application of federal law promotes the
equal treatment of similarly situated parties, facilitates the operations of multistate actors, and fosters predictability.256 Although there may be reasons for the Supreme Court to follow
lower courts in certain situations, promoting geographic uniformity is generally not one of them, as whatever decision the
Court makes will (at least in theory) be uniform throughout the
land.257
Thus, we currently have a system in which the lower courts
tend to follow a model of horizontal coordination while the
Supreme Court mostly charts its own course. Is that the best
way to run a judicial system? From the perspective of institutional design, one could imagine quite different possibilities, including some systems that essentially flip those two tendencies.
For example, perhaps the lower courts should act more independently, exercising their own best judgment rather than
showing deference to others. If they did so, that would increase
the value of their views on the epistemic rationale, which in turn
would give the Supreme Court some additional reason to honor
the majority view that emerged, thus creating a quite different
system than we have now. But let us suppose, as seems more
likely, that we retain a system broadly like our own, in which
lower courts value persuasive precedent much more highly than

254 See, for example, Admiral Financial Corp v United States, 378 F3d 1336, 1340
(Fed Cir 2004) (“[W]e do not create conflicts among the circuits without strong cause.”)
(quotation marks omitted); United States v Auginash, 266 F3d 781, 784 (8th Cir 2001).
See also Klein, Making Law at 89–91 (cited in note 42).
255 See, for example, James v Sunrise Hospital, 86 F3d 885, 889 (9th Cir 1996) (observing
that “we have been much influenced in the construction we adopt by the desire to avoid
intercircuit conflict” and that “there is virtue in uniformity of federal law as construed by
the federal circuits”).
256 But see Frost, 94 Va L Rev at 1579–1606 (cited in note 16) (summarizing and critically assessing the various arguments that are offered in support of geographic uniformity).
257 An exception to the statement that the Supreme Court need not worry about geographic uniformity arises in connection with the interpretation of treaties. Maintaining
uniform understandings on such matters has value in itself. See Abbott v Abbott, 560 US
1, 16 (2010).
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does the Supreme Court. Some interesting practical and theoretical
problems arise from this divergence.
Perhaps most importantly, the divergence raises questions
about how to maintain systemic stability. Surprisingly, the
system can actually work pretty well—despite the differences
between courts—if each level plays its role properly. By giving
sister circuits’ decisions a degree of deference and showing a
willingness to reconsider old circuit law that is out of step with
an emerging consensus, the lower courts can mostly maintain
uniformity all by themselves. Some splits will (and should) develop, of course, but a wise administration of the Court’s certiorari policy would tolerate some harmless splits (for example, local
procedural variations that do not threaten substantial rights).
For the rare question that proves to be both divisive and
important, the Court can step in. When it does so, it can usually
use the blank slate approach because, as Part II explains, most
situations that require the Court’s attention do not strongly implicate the values potentially served by downward deference.
Thus, even if the Supreme Court rejects the view that had prevailed in the majority of the lower courts, the system will usually
work just fine.
Trouble can enter the system from either end. Sometimes
there will be good reasons for the Supreme Court to defer to
lower-court consensus on the merits, but it will fail to do so.
Other times the Court might unnecessarily disrupt the system
by granting certiorari when it should not. Consider in this regard the case of Taniguchi, the translation-fees dispute discussed above.258 Most of the lower courts had allowed prevailing
plaintiffs to recover translation expenses as part of the costs of
the litigation, but the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court’s
merits decision, had it been the first word on the subject, would
have been fine enough, though it did compromise Congress’s
purpose in the name of a textual reading that was probably not
compelled. But Taniguchi might represent one of those instances
in which various considerations—stability concerns stemming
from the fact that many lower courts had allowed translation
expenses and even enacted local rules to that effect, epistemic
deference to the lower courts’ expertise in litigation procedure,
and so on—should have led the Court to follow the bulk of lowercourt precedent.259 Perhaps even more importantly, it is unclear
258
259

See text accompanying notes 153–59.
See text accompanying notes 157–59.

01 BRUHL_ART_SOFTA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

Following Lower-Court Precedent

9/5/14 11:21 AM

925

why the Court needed to hear the case at all. The question at issue
was the sort of procedural detail that can vary across circuits
without doing substantial harm.
The lower courts can also cause trouble, especially when
they mistake the Supreme Court’s blank slate approach for the
approach that they should take. When a lower court breaks from
its peers for the sake of pursuing a “better” interpretation—
often, these days, in the name of textualism—that can upset the
whole system. It would be valuable to know more about how
lower-court interpretive methodology affects the creation of circuit splits, for such work might shed light on the systemic costs
and benefits of various interpretive approaches as practiced in
the lower courts. For example, it may be that Professors
Eskridge and Frickey’s indictment of stability-flouting textualism
in the Supreme Court applies just as well—or indeed better—to
textualism in the lower courts.260
In the meantime, for an illustration of what one might uncover, consider a Fifth Circuit case concerning the proper interpretation of the Packers and Stockyards Act.261 One provision of
the statute prohibits meatpackers from engaging in certain conduct, as described in several distinct subsections.262 Three of
those subsections outlaw conduct only when it has an anticompetitive effect on the market or restrains commerce.263 But two
other subsections, in apparent contrast, refer merely to unfair,
deceptive, or discriminatory practices, without mentioning any
harm to the market at large.264 One might therefore suppose, on
textual grounds, that these two subsections reach the specified
injurious conduct whether or not it has any broader anticompetitive effect; their text does not expressly require any market effect, and that omission seems especially meaningful in
light of the language of the neighboring subsections. Indeed,
that is how the Fifth Circuit panel majority saw it, and the court
therefore allowed a plaintiff to sue based on individual injury
without proving anticompetitive effects.265

260

See text accompanying note 170.
7 USC § 181 et seq. See also generally Wheeler v Pilgrim’s Pride Corp, 536 F3d
455 (5th Cir 2008) (“Wheeler I”); Wheeler v Pilgrim’s Pride Corp, 591 F3d 355 (5th Cir
2009) (en banc) (“Wheeler II”).
262 See 7 USC § 192.
263 See 7 USC § 192(c)–(e).
264 See 7 USC § 192(a)–(b).
265 See Wheeler I, 536 F3d at 456.
261
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What made the case hard was that several courts of appeals,
relying largely on legislative history and the statute’s antitrust
background, had previously read all of the subsections as requiring
proof of anticompetitive impact on the market.266 According to the
Fifth Circuit panel majority, those prior courts had fallen into
error by deviating from the plain text.267
The Fifth Circuit then ordered rehearing en banc and reversed
course.268 Most interesting here is the crux of the en banc opinion’s reasoning:
The law rules best by being predictable and consistent. It is
predictability that enables people to plan their investments
and conduct, that encourages respect for law and its officials
by treating citizens equally, and that enables an adversary
to settle conflict without going to court in the hope of finding
judges who will choose a favored result. . . .
How then would an informed person predict the case before
us to be decided? He would begin by expecting us to look to
the opinions of other circuits for persuasive guidance, always chary to create a circuit split. . . . [H]e could not expect
a judge to interpret the statute by looking only at the bare
words of [the subsections at issue]. Surely he would predict
that the next court judgment would be consistent with the
judgments of the other circuits.269
The en banc majority thus appealed to cardinal rule-of-law values
like predictability in order to follow not text, but instead nonbinding precedent.
What is the predictability-minded jurist to do when confronted with a conflict between text and nonbinding precedent?
There may not be a right answer to these sorts of questions,270
266

See id at 460–61.
Id at 461 (“[O]ur sister Circuits have fallen into the very legislative history pitfall that the Supreme Court identified.”).
268 Wheeler II, 591 F3d at 357.
269 Id at 363. A concurrence contended that the text also supported this result, at
least if read in the proper historical context and in light of prior judicial constructions of
similar language in other statutes. See id at 364 (Jones concurring).
270 The separate matter of the tension between original meaning and precedent in
the context of the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisionmaking has spawned a voluminous literature, and it is fair to say that no consensus has emerged. For a few contrasting positions, see generally Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original
Meaning: Not As Radical As It Sounds, 22 Const Comment 257 (2005); Daniel A. Farber,
The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 Minn L Rev 1173 (2006); Lawrence B.
Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism,
and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U Pa J Const L 155 (2006).
267
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but cases such as this illustrate the possibility that no answer
can exist independent of one’s position in the judicial hierarchy.
According to the en banc opinion, the predictability-minded
judge should follow sister-circuit precedent instead of “the bare
words” of the text.271 That may well be right, in a lower court.
Yet one cannot help but speculate that, were the Supreme Court
ever to address the question that was before the Fifth Circuit,
the Court might well come out the other way, relying largely on
the type of textual argument that persuaded the original Fifth
Circuit panel, despite all of the lower-court precedent to the contrary. Of course, the Supreme Court is unlikely to take up the
issue as long as the lower courts remain in agreement. The
precedent-following but text-defying lower court is correct, if it
is correct, not because it has anticipated how the Supreme Court
would rule. Rather, it is correct because its adherence to precedent prevents the Supreme Court review that might result in a
reversal.
***
Parts II and III presented an examination, along normative
and positive dimensions, of the Supreme Court’s use of lowercourt precedent. This Conclusion, which traced some further implications, has been necessarily tentative. But I hope that it shows
the value of studying how methodological choices made at different
levels of the system do and should differ and, even more importantly, how those choices interact. There is much to discover
about even familiar topics like precedent, and it is easier to
identify new insights when one takes a step back and looks at
the judicial system as a whole.

271

Wheeler II, 591 F3d at 363.

